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ABSTRACT 
ENCOUNTERS AND PERCEPTIONS: A DESCRIPTIVE STUDY ON THE LOCAL 
AND KURDISH RESIDENTS OF LÜLEBURGAZ 
Nilay Yürek 
Program of Conflict Analysis and Resolution, M.A. Thesis, 2014 
Thesis Advisor: Ayşe Betül Çelik 
Keywords: intergroup relations, intergroup contact, social categorization. 
This study investigated the nature of the intergroup relationship and intergroup 
contact between the local and Kurdish residents of Lüleburgaz. Lüleburgaz was chosen 
due to the increasing number of Kurdish population in the city. Local and Kurdish 
residents living in the selected neighborhoods of Lüleburgaz were interviewed. The 
findings revealed that intergroup relations in Lüleburgaz are shaped around a social 
hierarchy, where the positions of the social groups are determined by the local people. 
In this social hierarchy, it was seen that the Kurdish population is placed at the lowest 
level. As for the intergroup contact, it was discovered that there is an asymmetry 
between the local people and the Kurdish residents in terms of the generalization of the 
positive contact outcomes. Local people tend to generalize the outcomes of the negative 
contact while accepting positive interaction with a Kurdish person as an exception. On 
the contrary, Kurdish residents are more likely to generalize positive contact outcomes. 
It was found that this asymmetry between the local and Kurdish residents stems from 
the asymmetry in social group status as well as the influence of the long-standing 
Kurdish question in Turkey and the official discourse which shape the perceptions of 
the people and create stereotypes that are difficult to challenge. In the end, a more 
structured intergroup contact setting and a reform in the official discourse and the 
media representations of the Kurdish population and culture is recommended for the 
generalization of positive intergroup contact outcomes. 
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ÖZET 
KARŞILAŞMALAR VE ALGILAR: LÜLEBURGAZ’DA YAŞAYAN YERLİ 
NÜFUS VE KÜRT NÜFUSA YÖNELİK BETİMLEYİCİ BİR ÇALIŞMA 
Nilay Yürek 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Programı, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014 
Tez Danışmanı: Ayşe Betül Çelik 
Anahtar Kelimeler: gruplar arası ilişki, gruplar arası temas, sosyal sınıflandırma. 
Bu çalışmada, Lüleburgaz’da yaşayan yerli nüfus ve Kürt nüfus arasındaki 
gruplar arası ilişkinin ve gruplar arası temasın yapısı incelenmiştir. Lüleburgaz, 
şehirdeki Kürt nüfusunda görülen artış nedeniyle seçilmiştir. Lüleburgaz’ın belirlenen 
mahallelerinde yaşayan yerli ve Kürt sakinler ile görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Bu 
görüşmelerde, Lüleburgaz’daki gruplar arası ilişkinin bir sosyal hiyerarşi doğrultusunda 
şekillendiği ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu hiyerarşide grupların konumlarının yerli nüfus 
tarafından belirlendiği görülmüştür. Ayrıca, Kürt nüfusun bu sosyal hiyerarşide en alt 
konuma yerleştirildiği gözlenmiştir. Gruplar arası temas ile ilgili olarak, yerli nüfus ve 
Kürt nüfus arasında, pozitif temas deneyiminin genellenmesi bakımından bir asimetri 
olduğu keşfedilmiştir. Yerli nüfus, negatif temas deneyimini tüm Kürt nüfusuna 
genellerken, pozitif temas deneyimini bir istisna olarak görmektedir. Buna karşılık, 
Kürt nüfus pozitif temas deneyimini genelleme eğilimi göstermektedir. Yerli ve Kürt 
nüfus arasındaki bu asimetrinin, gruplar arasındaki statü farkının yanı sıra uzun yıllardır 
Türkiye’de devam eden Kürt sorunundan ve kişilerin algılarını şekillendiren ve 
yıkılması zor stereotipler oluşturan resmi söylemden kaynaklandığı görülmüştür. Sonuç 
olarak, pozitif gruplar arası temas deneyiminin genellenmesini kolaylaştırmak için daha 
fazla yapılandırılmış bir temas ortamı ile Kürt halkı ve kültürüne yönelik resmi 
söylemin ve medya temsilinin değiştirilmesi gerekliliği vurgulanmıştır. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
This study is an attempt to explore the nature of the intergroup relationship and 
intergroup contact between the local and Kurdish residents of Lüleburgaz. Its aim is to 
understand around which factors are the social groups shaped and whether the presence 
or absence of contact between these groups has an influence on the perceptions of the 
members of the social groups. 
As a result of the recent attempts for the resolution of Kurdish question in Turkey, 
Kurdish question and conflict resolution strategies of the state have become a popular 
topic around the country. Within the scope of these resolution attempts, the state 
officials and governmental institutions have applied many legislative and political 
practices. Moreover, political debates took place and studies have begun on a new 
constitution which is expected to be more democratic. 
However, peace building is a more comprehensive process which goes beyond 
legislative adjustments and political agreements between the armed parties. For 
sustainability, it should also address to the basic level in a state, i.e. the people. 
Especially in long-term conflicts as in the case of Kurdish question - which has been 
ongoing for 30 years as an armed conflict with roots that further goes back to the 
beginning of 1900s – there are long-termed fear, distrust and hostilities. In addition, 
there are generally deep polarizations and definitely drawn enemy images that are 
shaped by the protracted violence and fights. Therefore, without addressing these 
problems that are deep rooted in the society, there is not much hope for a sustainable 
peace. No matter how well-designed laws and legislation are created, the hostilities and 
mistrust which are ongoing in the background will eventually find a way to re-emerge. 
As for the process in Turkey, this kind of an approach to peace building is what is 
missing in the resolution attempts. Akil İnsanlar (Wise Men) commission was formed 
as a weak attempt to reach to the society. However, this commission which were 
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composed of selected scholars, celebrities and journalists, could not go beyond serving 
as a simple conveyor of the plans of government to the public. Also, considering that 
they were regarded as the representatives of the ruling government, it is questionable 
whether they achieved to address to the supporters of the opposition parties. 
In this respect, this study is motivated to show that the perceptions of the people 
matter in terms of designing a solid peace process. To that end, it aims to highlight the 
need for a transforming approach intended for reconstructing the intergroup perceptions 
and relationships. With this aim, it presents a view from Lüleburgaz, a Thracian city 
which is characterized by continuously developing industry and increasing population 
via migrations. In other words, it provides a micro-level example for the 
aforementioned assumptions. 
Within this scope, the research includes three basic themes. The first one is the 
analysis of social-categorizations in the city. This involves understanding the self-
identifications and outgroup definitions of the people. The second theme is the analysis 
of intergroup relationships. This theme is involved to take a step forward from the 
perceptions of groups about each other to the perceptions about people about building 
relationships with each other. “Which factors shape the relationship between different 
group members?” is the main question of this theme. The last theme is the influence of 
social contact on the perceptions of the people. The inclusion of an analysis on the 
effects of social contact in the study is the result of the assumption that perceptions are 
transformed through contact, i.e. through getting to know one another. As opposed to 
legislative and political phases of a transformation process which happen at the 
institutional level, the stage for perceptual transformation happens at the societal level 
through mutual recognition and understanding. 
The study employs a less structured interview methodology. This method has 
been chosen due to the opportunity it provides for exploring the people’s perceptions 
through their own expressions. This method also conforms to the descriptive structure 
of the study as it enables us to have a holistic view of the social structure and 
relationships in the city. 
The study is composed of six chapters. The second chapter following this 
introductory first chapter, presents a literature review on the social categorizations, 
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intergroup relationship and social contact theory. The aim of this chapter is to provide a 
theoretical basis in accordance with the scope of the study. The third chapter provides a 
historical overview on the Kurdish Question in Turkey as it cannot be possible to 
comprehend the perceptions of the people fully without knowing the historical 
background of the issue. The fourth chapter presents the method employed for this 
study as well as an introduction to the respondents involved in the interviews 
conducted. It is followed by an analysis chapter, which summarizes the findings of the 
research. In the last chapter, I discuss the findings that are mentioned in the analysis 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
Blagojevic argues that "[e]thnically diverse societies carry various degrees of 
conflict potential" (2009:3). Indeed, many researches verify this suggestion by pointing 
to the post-Cold War period which has been characterized by ethnic conflicts, 
especially in the ethnically diverse countries in the Balkan Peninsula, Middle East, 
Caucasus and Africa (Howe & Urell, 1998; Isajiw, 2000; Lake & Rothchild, 1996). 
Therefore, it is not surprising to see that there has been a great academic interest in 
understanding the factors that lead to ethnic conflict and possible solutions for these 
conflicts. 
Social-psychology provides us with various explanations about "the ways that 
people interact with and are influenced by others” (Dovidio, 2013:1), hence offering 
some answers to the questions regarding the dynamics of intergroup relationships, 
causes and resolution of intergroup conflicts – including ethnic group conflicts. This 
chapter will give place to the social-psychological perspectives on the intergroup 
relations, and will focus on intergroup contact theory which offers improvement in 
intergroup relations through changing intergroup perspectives. It will also cover the 
literature on ethnic mobilization as it is an important concept in terms of understanding 
ethnic conflicts. 
The chapter will start with a brief introduction to social categorization and group 
membership. Then, two mechanisms which play an important role in social 
discrimination; namely, stereotyping and prejudice, will be explained. Next, intergroup 
conflict theories will be summarized. Finally, it will cover the studies on the intergroup 
contact theory. It is important to examine the studies on the influences of the social 
contact and to see the results of the research so far, because the main purpose of this 
study is to explore the nature of the intergroup relationship and intergroup contact 
between two social groups. Ultimately, the aim of this chapter is to offer a theoretical 
background in order to provide an understanding of how and why groups experience 
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conflict and whether social contact could promise hope in terms of improving 
intergroup relations. 
 
2.1 Intergroup Relations 
 
Intergroup conflicts, including inter-ethnic conflicts, have been widespread. 
Isajiw (2000) notes that there are 233 minority groups around the world that are at risk 
due to inter-ethnic conflicts. He questions why it is often difficult “to foresee or predict 
inter-ethnic conflicts and when they occur [it is difficult] to find effective ways of 
resolution (ibid., 106). Actually, there are many studies on intergroup relations, which 
attempt to explain the formation of social groups (including ethnic groups), dynamics 
that lead to conflict between two groups, and ways of solution with regard to intergroup 
conflicts. Of course, any study or theory can never propose an absolute method to 
predict conflicts. Also, there is no single way to address a conflict as each conflict has 
its unique dynamics, actors, and contexts (Çayır, 2012). However, understanding the 
group formations and different dynamics of intergroup relations is a significant step 
towards having a knowledge about the reasons of intergroup conflicts, as well as being 
able to think about resolution methods more effectively. 
 
2.1.1 Social Categorization and Ingroup – Outgroup Formations 
 
Categories are fundamental parts of human world because "they enable us to 
organize the world" (Kihlstrom, 2013)1. Social categorization presents us with mental 
representations and we make sense of the world and the people around us, and 
determine our social, political, and economic belonging and position in the society in 
accordance with these mental representations (Haslam, 1994). According to Kihlstrom 
                                               
1
 “Social Categorization, Lecture Supplement” at 
https://bspace.berkeley.edu/access/content/group/cf3d9c57-a0ab-4f22-b55f- 
4d8b59a1c15e/Lecture%20Supplements/SocCateg/SocCateg_Supp.htm [Accessed: September 17, 
2013] 
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(2013), the most significant outcome of social categorization is the “[division of] the 
world into two groups: Us and Them”2. To put in a different way, as a result of social 
categorization, people make sense of the world and their relation to the other people 
through social groups, namely ingroups and outgroups (Dovidio, 2013; Tajfel et al., 
1971). 
 
2.1.1.1 Ingroup Favoritism/Outgroup Hostility and Social Discrimination 
 
According to Rosenthal & Crisp, “(...) categorization provides a psychological 
basis for understanding [outgroup] to be different from us" (2006:503). Tajfel et. al. 
argue that under certain conditions this understanding of being different from the 
outgroup member may lead to "differential behavior” (1971:151). Competitive 
situations, perception of threat from the outgroup, and trying to achieve superiority over 
the outgroup are some of these conditions. These will be explained further in the 
section related to the intergroup conflict theories. 
The differential behavior towards the ingroup and the outgroup is explained by 
ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility (Brewer, 2007; Dovidio, 2013; Rosenthal & 
Crisp, 2006). Ingroup favoritism refers to the tendency of the people to “value their in-
groups positively and maintain positive, cooperative relationships with members of the 
ingroup” (Brewer, 2007:729). Researches show that even the act of dividing individuals 
into two separate groups itself is sufficient to create ingroup favoritism and/or outgroup 
hostility (Tajfel et. al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, Fisher, 2000). The findings of 
these studies are important because ingroup favoritism and outgroup hostility may 
cause social discrimination. According to Dovidio, individuals would like to “gain or 
maintain advantage for their group” (2013:3), thus, they tend to show competitive and 
discriminative attitude. 
                                               
2
  “Social Categorization, Lecture Supplement” at 
https://bspace.berkeley.edu/access/content/group/cf3d9c57-a0ab-4f22-b55f-
4d8b59a1c15e/Lecture%20Supplements/SocCateg/SocCateg_Supp.htm [Accessed: September 17, 
2013] 
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Sherif's Robbers Cave Experiment in 1949, constitutes a valuable empirical 
verification for the effect of social categorization on the discriminatory intergroup 
behavior. Sherif et al. (1954/1961) sorted 24 teenager boys into two different groups. 
They observed that after the boys were sorted into groups, the basis of the relationships 
shifted from interpersonal level to intergroup level, causing ingroup favoritism. For 
example, they tended to favor the members of their own group and use name calling 
towards the other outgroup. Later, the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) 
was developed in an attempt to explain intergroup discrimination. Studies on minimal 
group paradigm3 found that when people are assigned into separate groups and asked to 
distribute resources to the people from both their own group and the other groups, they 
tend to “allocate higher rewards to members of their own category relative to members 
of the out-group category” (Brewer, 2007:729). 
However, it should be noted that ingroup favoritism/outgroup hostility and social 
discrimination have significant roles in intergroup relations and conflicts. First of all, 
being exposed to the hostile and discriminative attitude of another group may pose 
threat to the fulfillment of basic needs such as safety, food, identity, justice, etc. 
(Kelman, 2008). Also, group members pf a group may feel vulnerable and victim of 
injustice (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003) when they face a discriminatory behavior. 
Consequently, these may lead to frustration and mobilization. 
Nevertheless, there are also some researchers, who oppose the idea that merely 
creating groups would lead to social discrimination (Rabbie and Horwitz, 1969). These 
researchers have suggested various factors related to intergroup relations in order to 
explain the sources of conflicts among groups. Some of these factors include 
conflicting interests, perception of threat, struggle for a positive social identity (Tajfel 
and Turner, 1979), etc. In the next section, these mechanisms will be explained under 
the relevant theories, after a brief introduction to two important mechanisms that play 
important role in social discrimination; stereotyping and prejudice. 
 
 
                                               
3
  Minimal group paradigm explains that categorizing people into arbitrary but different categories is 
enough to observe ingroup favoritism (Brewer, 2002). 
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2.1.1.2 Stereotyping and Prejudice 
 
Stereotyping is a cognitive function, which serves as a “simplifying mechanism” 
(Stephan, 1977:50) and makes it easier to relate certain personality and behavioral traits 
to a whole group of people. Stereotyping can be considered as both the result of social 
categorization and a factor that promotes categorization (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). 
Studies on stereotyping suggest that people tend to perceive outgroup members as 
less diverse than ingroup members. This tendency is referred as outgroup homogeneity 
effect (Turner et. al., 2007).  Thus, people make generalizations about “the "typical" 
characteristics of members of the [out]groups” (Ferguson, 2005). This kind of a 
generalization affects our judgments about the individual members of the outgroup and 
influences our attitudes towards them. 
Although stereotypes might be positive as well, researches show that positive 
stereotypes are more likely to be attributed to the ingroup, whereas negative stereotypes 
are attributed to outgroup members (Stephan, 1977; Fisher, 2000). This tendency to 
relate outgroup members to negative characteristics is problematic in terms of social 
relationships, because it leads people to misjudge both the ingroup and the outgroup 
members. That's to say, it causes people to ignore the positive behaviors of outgroup 
members and “excuse the negative behavior [of ingroup members]” (Fisher, 2000). 
Eventually, this fuels the intergroup anxiety (Turner et. al. 2007; Laher & Finchilescu 
2010; Critcher et al., draft; Greenland et al. 2012), which is defined as “a negative 
emotional arousal that can characterize intergroup encounters" (Turner et. al., 
2007:428). These are all important because negative stereotypes and anxiety may 
prevent people from communicating with one another. This lack of communication 
may even lead to hostility toward the outgroup, which can result in violent behaviors 
and human rights violations. Similarly, favoring the ingroup members and ignoring 
their negative attitudes may lead people legitimize the abusive, hostile, violent 
behaviors (Göregenli, 2012). 
Actually, prejudice and stereotyping are intertwining concepts, because prejudice 
involves making generalizations (stereotypes) about the outgroups. Turner et al. suggest 
that stereotyping is one of the cognitive components of prejudice alongside with 
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perceptions and judgment, whereas “feelings and emotional responses to a group” are 
affective components (2007:428). In their study, Miller et.al. (2004) also obtained 
results showing links between these two concepts. They found that “stereotype 
endorsement (…) has stronger relations to prejudice” (ibid., 232). 
Prejudice is a tendency to behave or evaluate the outgroup in a negative way 
(Miller et. al. 2004). Miller et. al. (ibid.) suggest that there are two main factors that 
cause prejudice: personal history of intergroup contact and personality traits regarding 
the political dispositions. The former refers to how the individual experiences the 
contact. For instance, they state that forced contact has a larger influence on prejudice 
rather than voluntarily involved contact. That’s because people who are willing to 
establish contact with other groups’ members have already low levels of prejudice. The 
latter explains that people with certain political dispositions such as authoritarianism, 
right-wing views, etc. are more likely to be prejudiced toward certain groups. However, 
they also confirm that emotions have a significant role on prejudice, as well (ibid., 232). 
In other words, negative emotions like intergroup anxiety may cause a feeling of threat, 
so the individual may be more likely to stay away from contact situation with the other 
group. This ignorance of the outgroup may fuel the prejudices toward the outgroup 
members. On the contrary, positive emotions may emerge as a result of certain 
conditions such as having a friend from the outgroup, and this may result in eliminating 
prejudice and developing more positive attitudes towards the outgroup. 
Prejudice may shape our feelings and opinions, consequently can influence our 
attitudes and behaviors directly. This constitutes a serious threat to intergroup relations, 
especially in multiethnic countries, due to its possible negative effects on peaceful 
coexistence (Duriez et.al. 2007). 
Although prejudice and ingroup favoritism may be evaluated as the causes of 
discrimination, some researchers propose that ingroup favoritism, or social 
categorization alone are not equal or antecedent to social discrimination (Gaertner & 
Insko, 2000; Brewer, 2007). They suggest that certain additional individual or context-
dependent variables are also effective for differentiation to take the form of 
discrimination. For instance, Gaertner & Insko (2000) propose that gender is a 
determinant factor in the emergence of social discrimination. Their research findings 
suggest that males included in the study discriminate against each other only due to fear 
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of outgroup or for maximizing economic welfare. On the other hand, females tend to 
show discriminatory behavior independent of the structure/context, just by being 
categorized in a group. According to these findings, Gaertner & Insko concluded that 
females are more likely to show ingroup dependence. 
Olivier and Woung (2003) suggest that we should take relative economic position 
and historical period into consideration while assessing the causes of outgroup 
hostility. The findings of their research on the whites and African-Americans versus 
Asian Americans and Latinos show that “[b]oth blacks and whites in low-status 
neighborhoods have more negative attitudes and perceive more competition with 
minorities than those in high status neighborhoods” (ibid., 580). Also, they propose that 
“sharply defined historical relationship” (ibid., 568) may cause negative attitudes as a 
result of nationalist or racial feelings that may arise due to bitter memories/war in the 
history. 
Likewise, Saguy and Dovidio (2013), and Hornsey (2008) emphasize the role of 
social context in intergroup attitudes. For example, Saguy and Dovidio argue that 
“high-status group members preferred to emphasize commonalities over status 
differences in intergroup encounters” (2013:11), because they do not want low-status 
group members question the legitimacy and stability of their high status. Hornsey, on 
the other hand, argues that social category should fit the “social reality” (2008:208) of 
the individual and should be accessible when the individual needs to use it. 
In the next section main intergroup conflict theories will be explained in order to 
discuss the conditions that lead to social discrimination, outgroup hostility and hence, 
intergroup conflict in detail. 
 
2.2 Intergroup Conflict Theories 
 
Literature on intergroup conflict focus on 4 theories to explain the causes and 
dynamics of intergroup conflict. These are 1) Realistic Group Conflict Theory, 2) 
Integrated Threat Theory, 3) Social Identity Theory and 4) Social Dominance Theory. 
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2.2.1 Realistic Group Conflict Theory 
 
According to the realistic group conflict theory, the cause of intergroup conflict 
and hostility is the incompatible interests of groups on rare resources (Tajfel, 1970; 
Bornstein, 2003; Dovidio, 2013). Tajfel differentiates between realistic group conflict 
theory and identity based intergroup conflict theories by saying that the former is a 
"genuine competition" (1970:96) while the latter is related to the "emotional tensions" 
(ibid., 96). In other words, realistic conflict theory assumes that the source of the 
conflict is realistic threat that people encounter, while the identity based theories focus 
on the perceived threats. As it was shown in Robber Caves experiment, (Sherif et. al., 
1954/1961), people develop ingroup favoritism attitudes when they are sorted into 
groups, because the competitions organized by the research team pose a realistic 
concern for the group members. Sherif et. al. (ibid.) also demonstrate that the 
competition over given goals and limited sources easily lead intergroup tension and 
outgroup hostility, such as name calling and fighting incidents in the experiment (ibid. 
p.9). 
 
2.2.2 Integrated Threat Theory 
 
According to Kelman, conflict occurs due to “collective needs and fears” 
(2008:171). Integrated threat theory assumes that intergroup conflict results when a 
group of people perceive threat from another group on the resources, safety, status, etc. 
(Lake & Rothchild, 1996). This assumption may also be considered as an alternative 
answer to Hornsey's question with regard to realistic conflict theory why groups prefer 
competition instead of another strategy (2008). From the viewpoint of integrated threat 
theory, when people perceive a threat to their resources or safety, they tend to behave in 
a defensive way and show aggression, which may lead to competition and conflict 
(Riek et al., 2006). 
Rothgerber (1997) says that threat can be perceived in two levels of relationships: 
interpersonal and intergroup. Interpersonal threat is explained as a threat that is directed 
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at individual resources or identity, while intergroup threat occurs when a threat is felt 
by a group of people over their identity, resources, security, etc. There are two types of 
threats: realistic threats and symbolic threats (Dovidio, 2013:4). Realistic threats 
include risk to safety, economy, politics, health or well-being. Symbolic threats, on the 
other hand, are threats to beliefs and values of a group. (Oskamp, 2000). 
Perception of threat from the outgroup may cause ingroup favoritism, causing a 
need for protection against external threat. Rothgerber (1997) proposes that threat leads 
to outgroup homogeneity perception, which is in strong relation with stereotyping. 
According to him, in the case of an external threat, “it appears that the focus on group 
survival and responding to the out-group is so strong that all members align with the in-
group and minimize differences from and within it" (ibid. 1210). For Lake & Rothchild 
(1996), it is obvious that these fears and perception of outgroup homogeneity have a 
significant effect on ethnic mobilization. They argue that "[e]thnic activists (...) 
operating within groups, build upon these fears of insecurity and polarize society. 
Political memories and emotions also magnify these anxieties, driving groups further 
apart. Together, these between-group and within-group strategic interactions produce a 
toxic brew of distrust and suspicion that can explode into murderous violence" (ibid. 
42). 
 
2.2.3 Social Identity Theory 
 
This theory proposes that the source of intergroup conflict is people's struggle on 
achieving a positive social identity (Tajfel &Turner, 1979). This theoretical view claims 
that people use social groups as a means for social identification, which occurs through 
self-categorization –  "a person's belief that they belong to a group" (Redmond, 2013). 
Identification may be either relational or comparative (Tajfel&Turner, 1979:40). To put 
it more clearly, people "evaluate their group with reference to relevant groups" 
(Hornsey, 2008:207). However, they do not compare their group with each and every 
outgroup. Instead, there are some comparability elements such as "similarity, 
proximity, and pressure toward in-group distinctiveness" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979:41). 
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As a consequence of this comparison, they would like to see that the social status4 of 
their group is high than the outgroup's social status.(Lalonde et al., 1987, Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979). 
The concern about social status of ingroup is important in terms of intergroup 
relations because as suggested by Dovidio, people tend to show ingroup favoritism and 
outgroup derogation in order to "maintain the positive distinctiveness of their group" 
(2013:3). Apart from triggering stereotyping in group evaluation, this distinctiveness 
may also cause “depersonalization”. Hornsey explains that “[w]hen a category becomes 
salient, people come to see themselves and other category members less as individuals 
and more as interchangeable exemplars of the group prototype" (2008:208). However, 
this is not a loss of identity, "but rather a shift in identity from the personal to the social 
level" (ibid., 210). Depersonalization constitutes a serious threat to intergroup relations 
as it may lead to violent conflicts. As a consequence of depersonalization, people 
regard outgroup members as less human and tend to ignore their lives (Dovidio, 
2013:3), a phenomenon also known as dehumanization in the literature (Brambilla et 
al., 2011). Hornsey emphasizes the role of "distinct individuals" (2008:210) throughout 
the conflicts in which depersonalization attitudes between group members exists. He 
argues that the behaviors and attitudes of these individuals become behavioral norms, 
which lead the way people think, feel, and act (ibid., 210). In the case of ethnic 
conflicts, for example, the actions of ethnic and political leaders influence the way 
people think and feel about other ethnic groups. 
 
2.2.4 Social Dominance Theory 
 
Social dominance theory explains prejudice and ingroup favoritism through 
dominant group members' support for social hierarchy. It assumes that people are not 
only concerned about preserving their social identity, but they also strive for a 
justification of their dominance and their actions as a group (Redmond, 2013; Duriez et 
al., 2007). According to the theory, there are three components that are used to ensure 
                                               
4
  “A group's relative position on some evaluative dimensions of comparison” (Tajfel and Turner, 
1979:43). 
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to legitimize group behavior: legitimizing myths, trimorphic structure and social 
dominance orientation of the group members (Redmond, 2013). Sidanius & Pratto 
(1999) explain legitimizing myths as “attitudes, values, beliefs stereotypes, and 
ideologies that provide moral and intellectual justification for the social practices that 
distribute social value within the social system” (in Redmond, 2013)5. These myths are 
not only used by the dominant group. Subordinate groups also use myths to legitimize 
their demand for resources and identity, as well. Trimorphic structure refers to building 
a hierarchical system according to age, gender and an arbitrary set that includes 
ethnicity, race, beliefs, class, etc. (ibid.). The third component, social orientation, is 
about the relationship between the individual's ideology/personality and their views on 
hierarchy (Dovidio, 2013). There are several factors that have an influence on a 
person's social dominance orientation, such as moral concerns (Dovidio, 2013), 
extrinsic goals (Duriez et al., 2007). For instance, Dovidio claims that high-status group 
members need “moral acceptance by the low-status group” (2013:10). In this way, they 
can legitimize their superior status and be comfortable with it. Duriez et al., on the 
other hand, found that extrinsic “goal pursuits relate to higher levels of SDO” 
(2007:776). 
Pratto et al. point out the role of legitimizing myths in ethnic conflicts. They 
argue that legitimizing myths normalize “group-based inequality” and “stabilize 
oppression” (1994:741). Similarly, Sidanius and Pratto report that always praising 
being strong and powerful “predispose children toward thinking of human relations in 
terms of dominance and submission” (1999:6). In the end, this causes people to see 
discriminatory behavior toward the members of other ethnic groups legitimate and 
normal. 
 
 
 
                                               
5
  Redmond, B. F. (n.d.). 8. Intergroup Theories (Integrated Threat, Social Identity, and Social 
Dominance) - PSYCH 484: Work Attitudes and Job Motivation - Confluence. PSYCH 484: Work 
Attitudes and Job Motivation. Available at: 
https://wikispaces.psu.edu/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=41095610 [Accessed: September 20, 
2013). 
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2.3 Intergroup Contact Theory 
 
Peace building process has gone beyond managing or resolving conflicts. Conflict 
transformation has emerged as a contemporary approach for dealing with conflicts and 
building peace. Conflict transformation efforts go beyond the site of conflict and 
involve “engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if 
necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent 
conflict" (Miall, 2004:4). In this sense, addressing and transforming the perceptions of 
conflicting group members plays an important role. That is because perceptions toward 
outgroup occupy an important place in intergroup conflicts, including ethnic conflicts. 
Indeed, Labianca et al. suggest that conflicts are "perceptual rather than behavioral" 
(1998:56). At this point, intergroup contact theory offers a prominent approach to 
reduce intergroup bias, improve intergroup relations and address intergroup conflicts in 
a constructivist way (Dovidio et al., 2003; Bilewicz, 2007; Brambilla et al. 2012; 
Cehajic and Brown, 2010; Crisp et al., 2009; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp, 
2006). 
Pettigrew (1998) and Dovidio et al. (2003) describe the mechanisms through 
which social contact reduces intergroup prejudice and promote positive intergroup 
relations. First of all, bringing different group members together provides functional 
relations (Dovidio et al., 2003:9). As it is seen in Sherif's Robbers Cave Experiment, 
assigning different group members for a common goal reduces their prejudice toward 
each other as well as providing cooperation between groups (1954;1961). In other 
words, common goals create functional relations which lead to interdependency and 
thus, cooperation instead of competition. 
Secondly, social contact results in changes in the behaviors toward outgroup 
members, and this has positive effects on intergroup prejudice. Dovidio et al. suggest 
that contact situation can facilitate the development of new norms of intergroup 
acceptance that can generalize to new situations and to attitudes toward the outgroup as 
a whole" (2003:9). Similarly, Pettigrew also points out the "potential to produce 
attitude change" (1998:71) via intergroup interaction. 
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Intergroup contact also promotes changes in the emotions. As opposed to the 
negative emotions that come out as a result of ingroup favoritism and outgroup 
hostility, such as intergroup anxiety and distrust, exposure to outgroup members can 
"reduce bias by enhancing empathy toward members of the other group" (Dovidio et 
al., 2003:10). Pettigrew calls this change in emotions as a process of generating 
affective ties and claims that "[p]ositive emotions aroused by intergroup friendship also 
can be pivotal" (1998:72) by showing examples from World War II. He mentions the 
non-Jews, who risk their lives as a consequence of their friendship with the Jews and 
positive emotions that result from their friendship (ibid., 72). 
Intergroup contact has also cognitive processes which reduce intergroup bias. 
One of them is learning about the outgroup (ibid., 70). As proposed by Dovidio et al. 
(2003) with reference to Pettigrew, "‘learning about others’ is a critical step in how 
intergroup contact improves intergroup relations” (1998:10). Thus, stereotypes are also 
challenged and mental representations of the outgroup members are corrected. The 
other cognitive process is the change in social representations of the outgroup members 
(Dovidio et al., 2003:11). Intergroup contact challenges the social categories and may 
cause decategorization and recategorization of the groups (ibid., 11). Therefore, 
predefined group boundaries, group norms, stereotypes and intergroup prejudice are 
replaced with more inclusive groups, elimination of stereotypes and reduction in 
prejudice. Also, exposure to outgroup members may help people see the outgroup 
members as more human and value their lives more. However, the effects of intergroup 
contact are not limited to the changes of the perceptions toward outgroup. As discussed 
by Pettigrew (1998) people also gain insight about their own groups. They re-think 
about and re-evaluate their ingroups, their ingroup norms and attitudes. Thereupon, 
they “reshape [their] view of (one’s) ingroup and lead to a less provincial view of 
outgroups in general (ibid. 72). 
It should be noted that intergroup contact does not always occur in a direct way. 
Indeed, there are four other types of contact. First of them is the extended contact, 
which refers to "learning that an ingroup member is friends with an outgroup member” 
(Dovidio et al., 2011:147). The second one is the imagined contact, which means 
simply imagining yourself in an interaction situation with an outgroup member (ibid.). 
The third indirect contact type is para-social contact which occurs through viewing 
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intergroup relationship via media, etc. This allows “modeling of positive intergroup 
behavior” (Harwood, 2010:151). Finally, there is vicarious contact which is based on 
“observing an ingroup member interact with an outgroup member” (Dovidio et al., 
2011:147). Studies have shown that these kind of indirect or structured (for example, 
interaction in a laboratory/research setting or in a dialogue group) contacts are also 
effective in influencing the perceptions of the people about one another (Dovidio et al., 
2011; Harwood, 2010; Cameron et al., 2011; Turner et al., 2007). In case of indirect 
contacts the influence occurs by taking the other ingroup member or the celebrity on 
the TV, etc. as a role model. Individuals see (or imagine and feel in case of imagined 
contact) that the outgroup member does not pose a threat. As a consequence, this may 
provide a reduction in the intergroup anxiety. 
The outcome of the intergroup contact is not always positive. Sometimes social 
contact may end up with more disliking and strengthened stereotypes (Crisp et al., 
2009; Pearson et al. 2008). Intergroup contact with negative outcomes is defined as 
negative contact (Paolini et al., 2010). In order to avoid such negative outcomes, 
theorists suggest certain conditions that should be met. These include contextual, 
qualitative, residential and individual-related conditions (Pettigrew, 1998; Hopkins & 
Hopkins, 2006). 
To begin with, Allport's (1954) suggestion of four conditions to facilitate 
intergroup contact constitutes the base for intergroup contact research. These 4 
conditions are: equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the 
support of authorities, law, or custom (in Pettigrew, 1998:66). According to this view, 
if groups perceive their status as equal, work on the same issue in a cooperative manner 
rather than competitive, and if their contact with the outgroup members are acceptable 
by ingroup norms, it is more likely to achieve positive outcomes and changes. 
Quality of the contact is also regarded as an important condition for positive 
outcomes. Cehajic and Brown's (2010) research, for instance, shows that contact quality 
has a significant relation with intergroup reconciliation. Similarly, Liu points out that 
"mere increased contact between groups is not enough to break down stereotypes and 
reduce tension. There is something qualitatively different about intergroup behavior 
(...)" (2012:5). The factors which determine the quality of the contact may vary. For 
example, Pearson et al. (2008) show that when one of the parties fails to give 
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audiovisual feedback in time during the intergroup conversation that were set for the 
experimental purposes, an increase in intergroup anxiety is observed. 
Historical, cultural and social context of intergroup conflict also has influential 
effect on contact outcome. To name a few, Bilewicz (2007) show that the effect of 
contact depends on the topic discussed during the conversation between different group 
members. According to his study, talking about contemporary issues has positive effect, 
whereas talking about past issues has no such effect (ibid. 556). Olivier and Wong, on 
the other hand, focus on neighborhood contexts and inter-ethnic propinquity, 
suggesting that "intergroup hostility is higher in metropolitan areas" (2003:567). 
Another study is on country's norms; Guimond et al. (2013) find that intergroup 
prejudice reduces when the norms are multicultural and policies are pro-diversity. In 
other words, in countries where diversity is appreciated and minorities/immigrants are 
welcomed, people are less likely to have prejudices. This is mostly because in pro-
diversity societies, people do not have to worry about the reaction of ingroup members 
to their positive attitudes towards outgroup members. Apart form this, Liu (2012) 
points to the fact that concerns about historical issues has also a significant effect on the 
intergroup contact outcome. He suggests that historical representations of past conflict 
affects intergroup contact, as they may remind people of bitter memories, thus creating 
tension during the contact. In such cases, the contact may lead to negative outcomes in 
terms of perceptions. 
Besides these contextual factors, researchers also point out the role of individual 
attributes. Among these are need for closure6 (Dhont et al., 2011), individual's being 
extrinsically oriented or intrinsically oriented (Duriez et al., 2007), individual's 
ideology (Hodson, 2011), and individual's being a typical group member or not 
(Brewer, 2007). To put it more clearly, in the case of people who have high need for 
closure, intergroup contact leads to more discriminatory behavior as a result of 
intergroup anxiety (Dhont et al., 2011:525). Similarly, if a person is more concerned 
about his/her extrinsic goals, the chance of positive contact decreases due to 
competitive behavior (Duriez et al., 2007). However, it is observed that contact among 
people with intolerant ideologies results in more positive changes in attitudes, decrease 
in prejudice and perceived outgroup threat (Hodson, 2011:155). This may be explained 
                                               
6
  Defined as "the individual's desire for firm answers and aversion toward ambiguity" at 
http://www.psych- it.com.au/Psychlopedia/article.asp?id=212 [Accessed: August 30, 2013] 
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by the argument that individuals with tolerant ideologies already have positive 
attitudes, so the experiment results may not measure a high level of change in attitudes. 
Last but not least, Brew (2002) shows that if a member of the group does not see 
himself/herself or is not perceived by the other members as a typical group member, 
he/she tends to behave more negatively towards outgroup members as they “need to be 
concerned with being similar to other in-group members, (…) [and] that they are not 
confused with the out-group” (ibid. 734). 
 
2.4 Migration, Residential Segregation and Intergroup Relationships 
 
It should be noted that migration is a process which is accompanied by 
continuous social change in the country or city of immigration. It transforms the 
societies (Castles, 2003) in sociological and economical terms. Social and cultural 
diversity in addition to the interaction between different social and cultural groups 
challenge the existing categories in the society and lead to “the reconstruction of selves 
and identities” (Horenczyk, 2008). As a result, economic and cultural considerations of 
the people may vary. For example, a minority group which was considered negatively 
before, may become closer to the majority group as a result of the arrival of a new 
migrant group which is regarded as less favorable. As a result, social status of groups 
may change.  
Sometimes these categories constitute a hierarchical social structure. As Marshall 
(1950) suggests, class categories are organized in a hierarchical manner based on the 
status of the relevant categories, migrant groups with different 
nationality/ethnicity/race, etc. may also be classified into different status levels and in a 
hierarchical order. Accordingly, migrants coming from a certain country, etc. may be 
less favorable than migrants coming from another country, hence positioned in a lower 
level in the social hierarchy. Kalra and Kapoor (2008) point out that the determiner of 
the social hierarchy is the majority group, because majority group defines “what are 
considered as acceptable values” (ibid., p. 6). As a result, the position of the social 
groups and the values attained to these groups take shape in accordance with the 
preferences of the majority group. 
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Moreover, in some cases, the differentiation among groups become more salient 
through residential segregation. Residential segregation can be considered as a 
geographically marked form the hierarchical social structure. According to 
Balakrishnan et al., it is a “reflection of social class differences” (2005:206). However, 
this reflection should not always be considered as an outcome of the marginalization by 
the majority group. There are also studies which propose the term “self-segregation” 
(Kalra and Kapoor, 2008:5); some people may chose to maintain their customs, values, 
family ties, etc. without the influence of the majority culture, hence choose to live in a 
segregated area. 
In either case, residential segregation has an important effect on the intergroup 
relations. Various studies show the correlation between ethnic-residential segregation 
and violent conflict (Kasara, 2012; York et al., 2011). Briefly, ethnic-residential 
segregation widens the gap between the groups and leads to conflict. In parallel with 
this, residential segregation has been considered as one of the effective factors in 
intergroup contact. It is obvious that living in the same neighborhoods, seeing each 
other on a daily basis increase both the possibility and the outcome of the contact. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In the first section of this chapter, various approaches to intergroup relations were 
presented. Firstly, social categorization processes were outlined and the factors 
affecting the ingroup-outgroup relations were identified. It was seen that people tend to 
perceive the world in accordance with the social categories that they created. In line 
with these categories, people also associate groups with certain mental representations. 
Later, in the section about the intergroup conflict theories, it was seen that these mental 
representations play a very important role in the intergroup interactions; the stereotypes 
attained to outgroup members and the negative perceptions which take shape in line 
with these stereotypes are indeed the core dynamics of intergroup relations. Basically, 
these stereotypes do not only reflect the intergroup perceptions; they also provide hint 
about the positioning of the groups in the social hierarchy. Therefore, it is obvious that 
understanding the social categorization process in a society is key to have a holistic 
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view of the intergroup perceptions. Accordingly, social categorization processes and 
the stereotypes attained to group members will be the first focus of the current study in 
attempt to understand the underlying perceptions of the people in question about each 
other. 
The second section of the chapter covered the theories of intergroup conflicts. 
This section shed light on the factors which lead to intergroup anxiety and conflict. In 
summary, researchers who approach the issue from a realist view see the competition 
over rare resources as the source of the discrimination and conflict. Some of them, on 
the other hand, point to the perceived threat from the outgroup. Social dominance 
orientation is also predicted as an important factor in creating intergroup discrimination 
and helping discriminatory behavior persist with the help of legitimizing myths. 
However, for the social identity theorists, it is the strive for achieving and maintaining a 
positive social identity that causes ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. These 
explanations about the intergroup conflicts once again point out to the influence of the 
perceptions on the intergroup relations. Apart from the cases where people fight for rare 
resources, it was seen that conflicts are mostly perceptual. Within the scope of this 
study, it is clear that attention should be paid to the main factors affecting the 
intergroup relations. In other words, it is important to understand whether there is real 
competition over the resources or people perceive threat as a result of their prejudice 
against the outgroup members. It is also essential to see whether the negative opinions 
and feelings remain at the perceptual level or reflected in the behaviors during 
intergroup interactions. 
In the end, all the information gathered regarding the formation of social groups 
and the relations between these groups will provide us with the data that we need in 
order to interpret the outcome of intergroup contact. As it was seen in the third section 
of this chapter, there are various factors affecting the outcome of the contact situation. 
Some of the researchers assume that the topic discussed during the interaction, 
historical background of the intergroup relations, quality of the contact, etc. are 
effective in obtaining positive outcomes, while some of them point out to the 
environmental factors, such as residential proximity (as referred in the fourth section), 
reactions of the ingroup members around, etc. It is sure that being aware of the factors 
that shape the social structure and relations in the city will be of great help in terms of 
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understanding the concerns of the people and how these concerns affect the intergroup 
contact outcomes. 
To sum up, the literature reviewed in this chapter does not only provide us with a 
theoretical basis regarding the subject of the study; it also indicates us where to look at 
to comprehend the study findings. In accordance with the scope of this study, the 
factors that we should pay attention to are the formation of social groups and the 
dynamics of intergroup relations in the city. Ultimately, I will refer to these factors to 
interpret the effects of intergroup contact on the intergroup perceptions and/or relations 
in Lüleburgaz. 
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CHAPTER 3: KURDISH QUESTION IN TURKEY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter will present the historical background of the Kurdish question in 
Turkey. By doing this, the chapter aims at providing an understanding of the actors, 
dynamics, and turning points of the Kurdish question. Having an overall knowledge 
about the historical development process of the issue is important in order to 
comprehend how the conflict has taken its current shape and how the Kurds and non-
Kurds in Turkey have become polarized through this process. 
The chapter will start with a brief information about the Kurdish population in 
Turkey to provide a demographic background. Then, it will cover the history of the 
Kurdish question under eight periods of which starting and ending points can be 
defined as critical turning points for the conflict. According to Barkey and Fuller, 
looking at the turning points are important in terms of understanding the conflict, 
because they “represent fundamental choices in the way societal relations are 
constructed” (1997:61). Accordingly, this chapter will start with a brief introduction to 
the situation of Kurds under the Ottoman Empire, with a focus on the start of the 
Kurdish rebellions after the Tanzimat Reforms (1839-1876). Then, the focus will move 
on to the effects of one-party policies (1920s-1945) on the Kurdish mobilization. 
Thirdly, the chapter will give place to a rather less conflictual period (Çelik, 2012?), 
which is the transition period to multiparty regime in Turkey (1945-1960). After that, it 
will show how the period beginning with the 1961 Constitution and lasting until the 
start of armed conflict in 1984 influenced the Kurdish movement. As for the intense the 
armed conflict period (1984-1999), it will cover the effects of the conflict on the people 
as well as the consequences of the fight between the Turkish security forces and the 
Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK). Later on, the chapter will move on to the reform 
process in Turkey (1999-2004), which began after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan – the 
leader of the PKK, and with the declaration of ceasefire by the PKK and Turkey's EU 
candidacy. Then comes the re-escalation of the conflict in 2004. The section related to 
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this period (2004-2009) will review the influences of the establishment of a federal 
Kurdistan in Northern Iraq (2004) and the PKK's declaration of end of ceasefire on the 
resurrection of the armed conflict. More importantly, this section will address the 
spread of the conflict to the Western cities of Turkey, causing a growing tension 
between the Kurdish and non-Kurdish people (Ergin, 2014; Çelik, 2012). This point is 
important because until then, the conflict was mostly limited to the Eastern cities and 
the main struggle was between the Kurdish people and the state. However, by mid-
2004, Turks also began to involve in the conflict and this caused an acceleration in the 
social stratification (Ergin, 2014). Finally, the chapter will cover the period beginning 
with the 'Kurdish Initiative' in 2009 by touching upon the resolution attempts until 
today as well as the incidents overshadowing the peace, such as the KCK (Group of 
Communities in Kurdistan) arrests in 2009 and PKK attacks in 2010. 
It is important to note that the aim of this chapter is not to provide a detailed 
historical or political analysis on the Kurdish question in Turkey. The overall purpose is 
to show the critical events that have shaped the course of the conflict, as it is assumed 
that they play an important role in shaping the perceptions of the people and the 
intergroup relationship between the Turkish and the Kurdish people in Turkey. 
 
3.1 Kurds in Turkey 
 
Kurds are “the largest transnational and stateless ethnic groups" (Ergin, 
2014:324). In general, they are spread around the four countries in the Middle East: 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. In Turkey, they constitute 18% of the overall population 
according to CIA Fact Book7. The number of the Kurdish diaspora is also significant; 
"there are some 850,000 Kurds in Western Europe, of which 500,000-600,000 live in 
Germany" (Baser; 2011:8). According to Ergin (2014), the mostly Kurdish-populated 
areas of Turkey are the Eastern regions. This information is confirmed by the "Kurdish 
                                               
7
  Turkey. [online]. CIA: The World Factbook. Available at: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html [Accessed: July 5, 2014]. 
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Lands" map by the CIA8, indicating the area that is heavily populated by the Kurdish 
people. 
According to the KONDA Report in 2011, which was based on a representative 
sample, the majority (33%) of the Kurds are primary school graduates, and only 7% of 
them are university graduates. In the Eastern regions, the ratio of the illiteracy is as high 
as 17-20% (ibid.). In the Western regions, however, the percentage is 5-8%. More than 
half of the Kurdish people (51.9%) gains below the minimum wage, which is an 
indicator for the economic struggles they have. Also, the socio-economic development 
index in the same KONDA report, shows that the ratio in the Eastern regions is the 
lowest (-1.50 to -0.50), while it is relatively higher in the Thrace region (0.50 to 1.49). 
and the highest in Istanbul (3.50 to 5.00). 
As it is seen there is a significant gap between the Eastern and the Western 
regions in terms of economic and social matters. The presence of the armed conflict in 
the region plays an important role in the underdevelopment and the disadvantaged 
position of the Eastern cities. After the start of the armed conflict in 1980s, the Kurdish 
people have begun to migrate to the Western cities to find better jobs and to escape 
from the conflict. According to the DPT (State Planning Organization) report in 2008, 
the rate of the internal migration increased from 9.3% in 1980 to 11.0% in 2000. Again 
according to this report, the outgoing internal migration rate is the fastest in the Eastern 
cities (p. 63). The majority of the people from the Eastern cities – Diyarbakır, Mardin, 
Siirt, Bingöl, Hakkari, Muş, Tunceli and Van – responded the question about their 
reason to leave their cities as “security concerns” (p. 55). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
8
  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1992). Kurdish Lands (location map). [image online] 
Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kurdish_lands_92.jpg 
[Accessed: April 01, 2013]. 
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3.2 Historical Background of the Kurdish Question 
 
Pre-Republic Era 
Originally, the Ottoman Empire was based on the millet system, which enables 
communities from different religions being ruled by their own religious 
leaders/institutions (Soysal, 1999). In this system, there was no ethnic differentiation; 
communities was classified according to their religions (Çelik, 2012). In accordance 
with this context, Kurds were part of the Muslim community, and there were no ethnic 
differentiation between Kurds, Turks, Muslim Albanians, and Arabs, etc. 
Towards the end of the 1880s, partly with the influence of the nationalist view 
introduced by the French Revolution, minorities living in the Ottoman territory had 
begun to organize uprisings to achieve their national independence. In order to prevent 
the dismemberment of the communities, the Ottoman rulers offered a series of reforms, 
known as Tanzimat Reforms (1839, 1876). The aim of these reforms was to “centralize 
the empire” (Akyol, 2009) and thus, to create a common Ottoman citizenship regardless 
of ethnicity and religion. 
However, these reforms were not welcomed by the Muslim communities, 
including Kurds. Until these reforms, the Muslim communities had political and 
economic autonomy unlike the non-Muslim communities. For instance, they were 
exempted from certain taxes that was being paid by the non-Muslims. Also, they were 
had control over their internal affairs as a community (Akyol, 2009). In other words, 
Tanzimat Reforms meant reduction of autonomy for the Muslim communities with 
different ethnicity. 
Nonetheless, as the minority uprisings throughout the Ottoman territories became 
widespread, the idea of Ottomanism (Osmanlıcılık) began to shift to Turkism 
(Türkçülük), especially in the beginning of 1900s, among the Committee of Union and 
Progress (CUP) members, whose aim was to achieve the establishment of constitutional 
monarchy in the Ottoman state. Turkism was based on the idea that “Turkish people 
were the unsur-i asli (main ethnic group) in the Ottoman Empire” (Yeğen, 2007:123). 
In accordance with this idea, institutions founded by the minority ethnic groups were 
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banned (ibid.). Turkish nationalism became more dominant especially after the 
revolution of 1908 (Second Constitutionalist Period – İkinci Meşrutiyet). Consequently, 
reduction in autonomy and rise in Turkish nationalism led to a discomfort and ethnic 
mobilization among the Muslim non-Turk minorities including Kurds. Two important 
outcomes of this discomfort were the uprisings such as the Bedirhan revolt in 1847, and 
formation of “the first nationalist organization, the Kurdish Society for the Rise and 
Progress” (Kürt Teali Cemiyeti) in 1918 (Barkey and Fuller, 198:8). 
One-Party Period 
One of the most important documents which framed the situation of the ethnic 
communities within the territories of the Turkish Republic was the Lausanne Treaty (24 
July 1924). According to this treaty, non-Muslim minorities gained some rights in 
terms of education and publication in mother tongue, whereas Muslim communities 
with different ethnicity were deprived of such rights as they did not hold minority status 
(Yeğen, 2009; Tank, 2005). 
Also, the primary concern of the newly founded state was to build a uniform 
national identity “to maintain territorial integrity in the aftermath of the Lausanne 
Treaty” (Tank, 2005:72) and to provide an “ultimate bond for political adherence” 
(Yeğen, 2007:126). With this aim, the Turkish state applied a broader definition of the 
citizenship which can be defined as an inclusive citizenship (Harkestad, 1998). This 
type of citizenship accepts “all the citizens of the Turkish state (…) constitutionally 
Turks” (Kushner, 1997:222). In other words, the state was ignoring the ethnic diversity 
in the country and rejecting the existence of any identity other than Turkishness. 
Consequently, Kurdish nationalism began to rise and the ethnic demands to obtain their 
ethnic rights and political autonomy ignored in the Lausanne Treaty and by the 
citizenship policies of the state, became more explicit (Barkey and Fuller, 1997). Many 
uprisings occurred until the end of the 1930s. Three of them have an important place in 
the history of the Kurdish question and collective memory of Kurds as their narratives 
“have been passed from generation to generation” (Çelik, 2012:244) and they have 
been reinterpreted by the Kurdish nationalists “in an attempt to establish continuity in 
the Kurdish resistance” (Tezcür, 2009:6). These are the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, 
Mt. Ararat revolt in 1930, and the Dersim rebellion in 1937-38. 
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Sheikh Said rebellion emerged in February 1925. It was “the earliest large-scale 
Kurdish rebellion in the Republic” (Çelik, 2012:245). It was led by Zaza speaking 
Sunni Kurdish sheiks9 (religious leaders) and Azadi10 (nationalist) leaders (Çelik, 2012; 
Barkey and Fuller; 1998). The main aim of the rebellion was to establish an 
independent Kurdistan (Olson, 2000; Çelik, 2012). Also, Martin van Bruinessen points 
to the religious motivations in this rebellion and describes it as “neither purely religious 
nor a purely nationalist one” (as in Olson, 2000:69). Although there is no consensus on 
whether the Sheikh Said rebellion is religious or nationalist in nature, it is still 
important in terms of Kurdish nationalist movement as it put the demand for an 
independent Kurdistan into words (Olson, 2000). 
The reaction of the state to the rebellion was harsh.  To deal with the rebellion, 
the state put Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu) into force in 4 
March 1925 and established two Independence Tribunals (one for the Eastern provinces 
and one for the rest of the country) in 6 April 1925 to execute the Law and punish the 
rebels (Zürcher, 2000). The rebellion was suppressed in 27 April 1925, and Sheikh Said 
and many other rebels was executed by hanging (Barkey and Fuller, 1997). In the 
aftermath of the rebellion, the state also performed “systematic deportations” (Çelik, 
2012:245) to Western cities. According to Zürcher (2000) the number of the Kurdish 
people who were forced to migrate is above 20.000. 
Sheikh Said rebellion is considered as a turning point as it “signifie(s) a change in 
the regime's attitude, from one of ignoring the Kurds to a policy of violence” (Barkey 
and Fuller, 1998:11). In other words, until then, the existence of the Kurdish 
community as a separate ethnic group had been ignored by both the Ottomonist view 
and the inclusive citizenship understanding of the Turkish Republic. However, the 
Sheikh Said rebellion was an attempt to make Kurdish existence visible. As this was 
not preferable for the state and its 'integrity' (Tank, 2005), the ignorance started to be 
accompanied by violent means to suppress Kurdish movements. As a result, the state in 
Turkey created a gap between itself and the Kurdish people. 
                                               
9
  Sheikh is an Islamic honorific used to refer to elderly religious/tribal leaders who has a spiritual 
training and who guides his followers as a spiritual authority. (Available at: 
http://hasankamilyilmaz.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=171&Itemid=29 
[Accessed: March 16, 2014). Sheikh Said was an influential sheikh among the Zaza tribes (Zürcher, 
2000). 
10
  Kurdish nationalist party mostly supported by Zaza-speaking tribes (Çelik, 2012). 
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The second important Kurdish rebellion was between 1927-1930; Mt. Ararat 
rebellion. It took its name from the Mount Ararat (Ağrı Dağı), around which the 
rebellion occurred. It was led by General İhsan Nuri Pasha, a former Ottoman soldier 
(Çelik, 2012). The preliminary factors of the rebellion were the assimilation policies of 
the state after the suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion (Çelik, 2012). Also, Nuri 
Pasha points to the intimidation policies by referring to “the devastation, destruction, 
and fear inflicted upon the Kurds by the TAF [Turkish Air Force] commencing in 
1927” (Olson, 2000:81). This rebellion was suppressed by the state with a heavy 
bombardment by the Turkish Air Force (ibid.). 
After these two large-scale rebellions, the state came up with a Law of 
Resettlement as an attempt to solve the Kurdish question via “Turkification 
(assimilation) of non-Turks” (Yeğen, 2007:129). This law proposed assimilation of the 
people into Turkish culture and evacuation of the regions that were resistant against 
assimilation policies (Çelik, 2012). As a result, 25,831 people were forced to migrate 
from Eastern and Southeastern provinces to the Western provinces (ibid.). Another law 
that is passed in accordance with the policies of the state was related to the name of 
Dersim, a city in the Eastern Anatolia known its Alawite and Kurdish population. 
According to Çelik, “Dersim was commonly known as the main problem area” 
(2012:246). The residents of Dersim reacted against this direct state control and 
assimilation attempts by gathering under the leadership of Sheikh Said Rıza and 
initiating a rebellion in 1936 (ibid.). Although this rebellion was Kurdish in nature 
(Barkey and Fuller, 1997), the state's attitude was to deny the ethnic-nationalist nature 
of the rebellion and show it as an “incitement by the outside forces” (Yeğen, 2007:131) 
and a tribal backward opposition to the Turkish revolution (ibid.). In parallel with this 
attitude, the state banned “references to Kurds as a distinct group in society (…) and 
use of the word “Kurd” (…) in the media” (Barkey and Fuller, 1997:64) during the 
rebellion. The revolt was was suppressed violently, Sheikh Said Rıza was hanged and 
thousands of people were executed (Çelik, 2012). Just like the other two rebellions, this 
rebellion also followed by forced “deportations and population control” (ibid.).  
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Transition to Multiparty Era 
Multiparty era in the Turkish Republic started in 1945 when the Democrat Party 
(DP) participated in and won the elections. After the suppression of the Dersim 
rebellion, Kurds were hurt and state control was strict. Although,  Barkey and Fuller 
(1997) describe this period from 1945 until the late 1950s as a relaxation period due to 
the liberal attitude of the DP, they also state that in the end DP also “fell victim to their 
own authoritarian tendencies” (ibid., 65) and bring the strict controls back. Therefore, 
there was no significant Kurdish opposition until the end of 1950s (Çelik, 2012). 
In 1960, the DP was deposed by a military coup. The leader and two ministers of 
the DP were hanged as they were found guilty due to their policies and putting laicism 
at risk. The military regime was also strict against the Kurds. For instance, military 
rulers accused the DP of attempting to establish a Kurdistan Government as well (Fırat, 
2008). Also, they started “assimilationist language policies" (Cemiloğlu, 2009:35) 
against the use of Kurdish language, arrested prominent Kurdish people (Fırat, 2008), 
and began to replace the Kurdish town and village names with Turkish ones (Çelik, 
2012; Barkey and Fuller, 1998). However, before the political elections for a civilian 
government, 1961 Constitution was issued. Contrary to the strict military rule, this 
constitution provided some freedoms in terms of Kurdish movement (Barkey and 
Fuller, 1997). This period beginning with the 1961 Constitution and lasting until the 
start of the armed conflict in 1984 will be covered in the next section. 
 
Period Between the 1961 Constitution and Start of the Armed Conflict in 1984 
The 1961 Constitution provided a “rather 'democratic' environment” (Çelik, 
2012:246) in terms of civil liberties (van Bruinessen, 1984:8), and formation of trade 
unions and student associations (Barkey and Fuller, 1998). In this environment, 
Kurdish movement found some opportunity of organization and mobilization within the 
legal associations. The first of these associations was the Workers' Party of Turkey 
(Türkiye İşçi Partisi – TIP). Çelik mentions that TIP is a “milestone in the legal 
Kurdish mobilization” (2012:247). However, the discourse of the TIP was shaped 
around class struggle and economic inequality (Çelik, 2012; Tocci and Kaliber, 2008). 
Therefore, the Kurdish question was not addressed as an ethnic issue by the TIP until 
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1970, when it openly recognized the existence of an ethnic Kurdish question in Turkey 
as a result of the efforts of its Kurdish members (Barkey and Fuller, 1998). This 
declaration was used against the party in the aftermath of the military coup in 1971 and 
the TIP was closed (ibid.). 1971 was also marked with the re-emergence of strict 
control on the freedoms and many leftist parties and organizations were banned (Çelik, 
2012). 
Even before the 1971 military coup, Kurds had realized that “the Turkish left 
organizations did not respond to their needs” (ibid., 247) and had started to form 
Kurdish organizations such as the Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths (DDKO) 
(Bruinessen, 1984; Barkey and Fuller, 1998). However, the restraining atmosphere of 
the 1970s did not let legal organizations to flourish. When the issues related to 
economic deprivation, forced migration and lack of rights all came together, illegal 
Kurdish organizations began to be founded (Çelik, 2012). Among them the most 
important was the Kurdistan Workers' Party (the PKK) which was founded in 1974. 
Tocci and Kaliber explain the aim of the PKK as “to establish a pan-Kurdish state 
based on Marxist-Leninist principles” (2008:4). The role of the PKK became more 
significant after the military coup in 1980. 
The military coup in 1980 was a result of highly polarized political system and 
the ideologically polarized society (Çelik, 2012). The military regime in 1980 is 
considered as the most strict and oppressive rule ever, especially against the Kurdish 
community (Barkey and Fuller, 1997). It led to the arrest of thousands of people and 
500 people were received death penalty. As a result of this coup, a new constitution, 
1982 Constitution, was issued. This constitution brought harsh restrictions on political 
freedoms. Use of Kurdish language and formation of associations were banned (Çelik, 
2012; Barkey and Fuller, 1998). Also, the enforced disappearances began. “Losing” 
people mostly when they were under custody had become a way of bullying against 
Kurdish mobilization. This phenomenon continued even after the foundation of a civil 
government, and approximately 1200 people disappeared since 1980 till 200511.  
All these restrictions and oppressive policies resulted in an increase in the 
Kurdish nationalism and “contributed to the eventual appeal of the PKK” (Barkey and 
                                               
11
  “Disappearances Under Custody”. [online]. Available at: 
http://narphotos.net/Story/Thumbnail/disappearances-under-custody/23/ [Acessed: December 18, 
2013]. 
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Fuller, 1997:16). Eventually, the Kurdish question transformed into an armed conflict 
with the armed attack of the PKK on the Turkish security forces in 1984. 
 
Armed Conflict Period 
The period which started with the armed assaults in 1984 and lasted until the 
capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, was the most violent and bloodiest era of 
the conflict. By the end of 1999, the result of the conflict was “more than 31.000 
deaths, as many as 3000 villages destroyed, and some 3.000.000 people internally 
displaced" (Gunter, 2000:849). Regarding this period of armed conflict, Tocci and 
Kaliber (2008) points to the vicious circle created by the mutual increase in violence by 
both the state and the PKK. 
One of the most significant consequence of the escalation of the conflict was the 
declaration of the emergency rule (Olağanüstü Hal – OHAL) in 1987. This emergency 
rule served to “restrict civil rights and freedoms” (ibid., 5). In 1991, another incident 
occurred which led to an increase in the tension in Turkey; the Gulf War. The violent 
suppression of the Kurdish uprisings by the Iraqi state during the Gulf War forced 
many Kurdish people escape to Turkey. Barkey and Fuller (1997) estimate the number 
of the refugees as more than half a million. The US solved the refugee problem in 
Turkey by creating a “quasi-autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq” (ibid., 67). 
This was perceived as a potential threat by the Turkish state. Accordingly, in April 
1991, the state issued the Anti-Terrorism Law which legalized the fight against 'the 
PKK terrorism' (Tocci and Kaliber, 2008) and punished any 'separatist' demands or 
discourses. With this law, the aim of the state was to prevent any demand for autonomy 
like the one in the Northern Iraq and suppress the PKK activities. The name of the law 
also shows a news turning point in the state's perception of the Kurdish question. It is 
seen that the ignorance of the early years and the perception of the issue as a 'problem 
of backwardness' (Yeğen, 2007) was replaced with the idea of terrorism and Kurdish 
question as a security issue. This caused more and more strict reaction of the state as 
well as more violent assaults by the PKK towards the mid-1990s, which is defined as 
the peak of armed conflict (Çelik, 2012). The violent actions by both parties and 
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increase in human rights abuses, disappearances and torture continued until the capture 
of the Öcalan in 1999. 
 
The Reform Period 
With the capture of Öcalan, a new phase started in the conflict. The PKK declared 
ceasefire, which provided a break from years of violence. It seems that the support of 
the Kurdish public for an independent Kurdistan was also decreased after their captured 
leader Öcalan made a call for nonviolence (Müftüler-Baç, 1999). Another important 
factor that caused a transformation in the conflict towards nonviolence was the reform 
process in Turkey in parallel with its EU candidacy (Çelik and Rumelili, 2006; Ergin, 
2014; Kirişçi, 2011; Tank, 2005). Within the scope of the EU reforms, some important 
constitutional, legal and social reforms, including the elimination of the state of the 
emergency (Tank, 2005). Çelik defines the rather calm atmosphere during this reform 
period as “negative peace” (2012:250) as Kurdish question was not directly addressed 
and solved. On the contrary, the continuing security-oriented discourse of the state was 
creating disappointment and discomfort among Kurds (ibid.). Eventually, in 2004, the 
PKK declared the end of the ceasefire and the tension in the country rose once again. 
 
Re-escalation of the Conflict 
Within the democratic and reformist atmosphere of early 2000s, a law “granting 
amnesty to PKK members (not in key positions)” (Tank, 2005:70). However, as a result 
of the state's doubtful willingness to implement this law and continuation of the state's 
security-oriented discourse, the PKK declared the end of the ceasefire. This time, the 
conflict was not limited to a struggle between the state, the PKK and the Kurdish 
community. Instead, Ergin mentions reporting of growing tension “between Turkish 
and Kurdish residents of cities in Western Turkey” (2014:323). Similarly, Çelik points 
to “the spread of violence to the cities of Western Turkey” (2012:251). On of the 
important factors that led to this spread of the conflict to the Western cities was the 
flag-burning incident where a group of Kurdish people burnt a Turkish flag. This 
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incident caused nationalist demonstrations by the Turkish people12. Other factors were 
the PKK attacks on the “urban, economic and tourist targets, particularly in the summer 
of 2005 and again in the summer and fall of 2007” (Tocci and Kaliber, 2008:30). 
With regard the state, there were also international situations that caused concern 
in terms of security. One of them was the establishment of a federal Kurdistan in 
Northern Iraq in 2004 (Ergin, 2014). The foundation of this federal state increased the 
security concerns and fear of separatist Kurdish demands (Tank, 2005). The growing 
tension began in 2004 resulted in the Law for the Fight against Terrorism in 2006i 
similar to the one in 1991. Thus, both the PKK and the state took a step back from the 
progression that had made since the beginning of 2000s. 
 
Resolution Attempts 
In July 2009, after another period of armed conflict, the Justice and Development 
Party (the AKP) initiated the so-called “Kurdish opening” with an attempt to resolve 
the Kurdish issue through peaceful means. According to Kirişçi (2011), the reason of 
this attempt was to restore the Kurdish votes in the Southeastern region. Larrabee and 
Tol, on the other hand, argue that “[t]he strengthening of civilian control over the 
military in Turkey in recent years has made it easier for Ankara to change its approach 
to the Kurdish issue" (2011:144). At this point, it may be useful to mention the opening 
of TRT 6, a state channel broadcasting in Kurdish, in January 2009 and first private 
Kurdish courses in 2004 (Çelik, 2012) in order to show that “the Kurdish Initiative” had 
been historically built. Despite the end of the ceasefire and continuation of the armed 
conflict, there were political and legal endeavors for the resolution of the Kurdish 
question. 
However,  it is the Kurdish Initiative that created an atmosphere in which Kurdish 
question could be discussed publicly (Ensaroğlu, 2013:12). But, part of the Turkish 
public reacted to the opening with suspicion and perceived it as a security threat. This 
suspicious approach may be related to the timing of the initiative, which was in the 
middle of a period of growing tension. However, the surveys conducted just after the 
                                               
12
  Dymond, J. "Flag-waving frenzy grips Turkey" on 24.04.2005. [online]. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4379675.stm [Accessed: October 26, 2013]. 
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start of the opening process in 2009, showed that the ratio of people who did not 
support the initiative was just 36.4% (Çelik,2013:45). 
According to Ensaroğlu (2013) the underlying initiator of the opening process 
was the negotiations between the Turkish Intelligence Agency, and Abdullah Öcalan 
and the PKK. These negotiations are known as the Oslo Process. He states that the Oslo 
Process “eradicated the perception that direct talks between the state and the PKK were 
an extraordinary affair and provided an opportunity for both parties to get to know each 
other and their exact demands” (ibid., p.13). However, the course of the process was 
not smooth. Police operations were held against Kurdish politicians, known as the KCK 
case, and the “DTP was illegalized” (Villelas, 2011:7). Yet, upon a hunger strike in 
2012 to protest Öcalan's conditions in İmralı prison and the failure of the state to 
provide the Kurdish people with their democratic rights, the İmralı process started in 
the beginning of 2013. Since then, some important steps were taken by both the state 
and the PKK. These include the acceptance of court defense in Kurdish language, 
withdrawal of the PKK out of Turkey and recently the allowance of education in 
Kurdish in private schools. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
For years, the Turkish state ignored the presence of Kurdish community as a 
separate community and the Kurdish identity. It is possible to see this approach in the 
policies during the Ottoman Empire and the early years of the Turkish Republic. It is 
seen that even after rebellions between 1925 and 1935, the state reported the issue as a 
problem of backwardness and opposition to the new secular system, maybe mostly 
because these rebellions were led by religious leaders – sheikhs. We also observed how 
the ignorance of the state and the use of violent means in dealing with the conflict led to 
a greater Kurdish mobilization. Studies offer that when the conflict transformed into an 
armed one, the state still failed to “fac[e] the root causes of the conflict” and addressing 
the identity issues of the Kurds (Aydınlı and Özcan, 2011:441). What is worse, the state 
also failed to separate “the Kurdish problem from that of the PKK” (Galetti, 1999:126).  
As a consequent, it is assumed that it is the failure of the state to address the Kurdish 
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demands and the repressive policies of the state which led both to the strengthening of 
the PKK as one of the primary actors in the Kurdish conflict and to an increase in the 
nationalism among Kurds. 
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CHAPTER 4:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces the research design that is used within the scope of the 
current study. Accordingly, the sections of this chapter include the setting and sampling 
procedure as well as a brief information about the data collection method employed in 
this study.  
 
4.1 Setting of the Interview 
 
4.1.1 Lüleburgaz as a Case 
 
Lüleburgaz is a city located in the Thrace region of Turkey. As of 2011, It has a 
population of 136.78313. Its economy is mostly based on industrial sector, which has 
been growing continuously. Lüleburgaz is described as “one of the three industrial 
centers in the Thrace”14. The industrial development in the city is the result of the city's 
location on D-100 highway; its closeness to Istanbul and customs gates, Kapıkule and 
İpsala; and its water resources and flat terrain which make the city convenient for 
building factories. Also, it is half an hour away from the European Free Zone, a private 
industry area which is defined as “the center of the trade between Turkish exporters and 
Europe”15. 
                                               
13
  İlçelere göre il/ilçe merkezi ve belde/köy nüfusu - 2011. Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi Veri 
Tabanı. [online report]. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. Available at: 
http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_turkiye_ilce
_koy_sehir.RDF&p_il1=39&p_kod=1&p_yil=2011&p_dil=1&desformat=html [Accessed: May 1, 
2013]. 
14
  Unknown. (2012). Sanayi Üçlüsünün Kırklareli Merkezi Lüleburgaz | Trakya Kalkınma Ajansı. 
[online] Available at: http://www.trakyaka.org.tr/content-204-
sanayi_uclusunun_kirklareli_merkezi_luleburgaz.html [Accessed: 1 May 2013]. 
15
  Unknown. (2012). Location. [online]. Available at: http://www.asb.com.tr/pages/EN/freezone-
location.asp [Accessed: May 1, 2013]. 
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All these economic advantages, as well as the developing cultural and social life, 
have made Lüleburgaz an attractive destination for the domestic migration from 
economically underdeveloped regions of Turkey. According to a TÜİK report, 8118 
people living in Lüleburgaz are from Southeastern Anatolia and Eastern Anatolia 
regions16 – the regions that are known for the intensity of Kurdish population17. 
Although this does not mean that all the people coming from these cities are Kurdish, it 
is still an important data to guess the intensity of the Kurdish population in Lüleburgaz. 
For this study, the case of Lüleburgaz was selected for two reasons. First, both the 
current presence of the Kurdish migrants and the expected migrations in the future due 
to the growing industry and demand for labor force in the city, make the peaceful inter-
ethnic relations and coexistence in the city important. As Kaldor and Luckham (2001) 
point out, it is necessary to develop “proposals for transforming the conditions giving 
rise to conflict” (p. 63). Therefore, researching inter-ethnic perceptions and relations in 
the city, may provide useful insights regarding the existing conditions and/or possible 
issues that may arise in line with the ethnic conflict in Turkey. 
Second reason is the recent tension between the local people and the Kurdish 
migrants living in the Thrace region. This also supports the above mentioned necessity 
of solving the problems in the societal level for a stable peace. Two newspaper 
headlines about two incidents show the ongoing tension clearly18,19. According to these 
news articles, local people in Kırklareli carried out racist attacks against the Kurdish 
residents. 
Also, in a recent labor demonstration in Lüleburgaz, one of the slogans was 
“[t]hose who see Diyarbakır, should see Lüleburgaz as well”20. Due to the rapid 
                                               
16
  İkamet edilen ilçeye göre nüfusa kayıtlı olunan il - 2012. Adrese Dayalı Nüfus Kayıt Sistemi Veri 
Tabanı. [online report]. Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu. Available at: 
http://rapor.tuik.gov.tr/reports/rwservlet?adnksdb2&ENVID=adnksdb2Env&report=wa_ikametedile
n_ilce10sonrasi.RDF&p_kod=2&p_ikil1=39&p_ikilce1=1505&p_yil=2012&p_dil=1&desformat=ht
ml [Accessed: May 2, 2013]. 
17
  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1992). Kurdish Lands (location map). [image online] 
Available at: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kurdish_lands_92.jpg 
[Accessed: April 01, 2013]. 
18
  "Irkçılık Malatya'dan Kırklareli'ne Taşındı", Yurt, 16 August 2012. Available at: 
http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.tr/gundem/irkcilik-malatyadan-kirklareline-sicradi-h17209.html 
[Accessed: May 03, 2013]. 
19
  "Kırklareli'de Kürtlere Irkçı Saldırı", Evrensel, 15 August 2012, Available at: 
http://www.evrensel.net/news.php?id=34506 [Accessed: May 03, 2013]. 
20
  “İşçinin Yanıtı”, Aydınlık, 24 March 2013, Available at: 
http://www.aydinlikgazete.com/mansetler/20249-iscinin-yaniti.html [Accessed: May 03, 2013]. 
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industrialization, the factory workers in the city face a lot of problems. They blame the 
AKP government for these difficulties by drawing attention to the AKP policies which 
endanger the work safety and cause lawlessness21. The reference to the resolution 
process in a labor demonstration shows that the workers see the emphasis of the 
government on the Kurdish question as an inequality due to its indifference to the 
problems of the workers. This brings us to the requirement to “address a range of 
dimensions (micro- to macro- issues, local to global levels, grassroots to elite actors, 
short-term to long-term timescales)” in the conflict transformation (Miall, 2004:17), 
because addressing the political problems without addressing the social and economic 
concerns of the people may cause opposition against the political actions. 
Another reaction regarding the Kurdish question was a statement by Lüleburgaz 
Ülkü Ocakları Eğitim ve Kültür Vakfı, a Turkish nationalist youth association: “[Our 
movement] will be the leading actor in calling [this process] to account. (…) [They] are 
trying to eliminate the Turkish race”22. This reaction again proves the importance of 
addressing the issues at the societal level and transforming the society by changing the 
perspectives of the people. 
All these examples show that for a peaceful coexistence and inter-ethnic 
relationship in Lüleburgaz, it is useful to investigate the perceptions of these people 
about each other and living together. 
 
4.1.2 Neighborhoods 
 
Two neighborhoods in Lüleburgaz were selected as the research setting: Durak 
neighborhood and 8 Kasım neighborhood. When selecting these neighborhoods, the 
main criteria was the existence of Kurdish population in the neighborhoods. Also, in 
order to see whether social contact has any influence on the perceptions of the people, 8 
                                               
21
  "İşçiden 'artık yeter be ya'”, Cumhuriyet, 24 March 2013, Available at: 
http://www.kristalis.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/cumhuriyet-trakya.jpg [Accessed: May 03, 
2013]. 
22
  ‘Hesap sormanın baş aktörü olacağız’. Lüleburgaz Görünüm Gazetesi, 26 March 2013, Available at: 
http://www.gorunumgazetesi.com.tr/haberler/-8216-hesap-sormanin-bas-aktoru-olacagiz-8217-.html 
[Accessed: May 03, 2013]. 
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Kasım neighborhood with a mixed Turkish and Kurdish population (together with other 
migrants) was selected as opposed to the Durak neighborhood where the Kurdish 
population live in a residentially segregated area isolated from the Turkish population. 
In the neighborhoods, Turks and Kurds were treated as two sub-sample groups. 
Durak Neighborhood: This neighborhood is approximately 3.3 km away from 
the city center (see the Appendix 1). Its total population is 2944, and its population over 
the age of 18 is 2182 as of 2013 (TUIK Report, 2013). The overall population of this 
neighborhood is composed mainly of farmers and factory workers, younger population 
falling in the latter group. 
Between the city and the neighborhood, there are farms and agricultural fields. 
With this respect, it can be considered as the suburb of the city. The neighborhood is 
important in terms of transportation as the railway passing through it connects the city 
of Lüleburgaz with most of its villages. That is why it is also called as “İstasyon” (Train 
Station) by the people. 
Durak neighborhood is the main settlement location for the Kurdish migrants 
arriving in Lüleburgaz. It is the neighborhood with the densest Kurdish population all 
over the city. Indeed, Kurdish population have recently begun to settle in other 
neighborhoods. For instance, during the preliminary research for this study, it was seen 
that many local Turkish people who were asked what they know about the Kurdish 
population in Lüleburgaz answered this question as: “I know that they live in İstasyon, 
but I do not know if there are any Kurdish people living in the center”. Also, the 
neighborhood is the main gathering area of the Kurdish population for the cultural and 
political events such as the celebration of Newroz23,24,25. 
The first settlements in the neighborhood is predicted to have started after the 
opening of this train station in 1873 (Kösebay Erkan, 2011). Among the first residents 
of the neighborhood there were civil servants working in the train station and living in 
                                               
23
  Celebration of the new year and the coming of spring on the 21 March. 
24
  "Lüleburgaz'da Nevruz kutlaması için geniş güvenlik önlemi alındı," Zaman, March 21, 2012, 
Available at: http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_luleburgazda-nevruz-kutlamasi-icin-genis-guvenlik-
onlemi-alindi_1262168.html] [Accessed: November 15, 2013]. 
25
  "BDP'den Lüleburgaz'da Nevruz Kutlaması (!)", March 21, 2012, Available at: 
http://www.trakyahaberleri.com/haber-7786-bdpden-luleburgazda-nevruz-kutlamasi-.html# 
[Accessed: November 15, 2013]. 
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the lodging building there, as well as some farmers. Later, the population of the 
neighborhood has been started to become more diverse. First, some farmers from the 
neighboring villages and the city center have begun to settle there. Then, part of the 
Bulgarian Turks coming from Bulgaria after 1989 have begun to settle in the 
neighborhood as well. In the beginning of the 2000s, migrants coming from the 
Anatolia have also arrived. However, Kurdish migrants have settled in a segregated 
area on the Western side of the neighborhood (see the area in a black rectangle in the 
Appendix 2) while the Bulgarian Turks and the non-Kurdish Anatolian migrants live 
together with the local people in the rest of the neighborhood. 
8 Kasım Neighborhood: 8 Kasım neighborhood is located on the South of 
Lüleburgaz. Its total population is 6859, and its population over the age of 18 is 5028 as 
of 2013 (TUIK Report, 2013). The overall population of the neighborhood is composed 
of middle-class workers, mainly factory workers or workers employed in the shops, 
construction works, etc. 
In the 1990s, the neighborhood was composed of mainly two housing 
developments, Aydınkent and Maliye Lojmanları. Later, in parallel with the increase in 
the city's population, new houses have been built in the neighborhood, of which the 
most recent one is TOKİ Burgazkent (see the Appendix 3). Also, one of the most recent 
high schools in Lüleburgaz, (Düvenciler High School) and one of the most recent 
hospitals in the city (Özel Bir Nefes Göğüs Hastalıkları Hastanesi) were built in the 
neighborhood. More importantly, it is important to mention that this neighborhood has 
gained its individual neighborhood status in 2000s. Until then, part of it was within the 
territories of Kurtuluş neighborhood, while the other part was in the Hürriyet 
neighborhood. All these developments indicate the increasing settlement demand in the 
neighborhood. 
As it is a recently created neighborhood, the population of 8 Kasım reflects the 
recent demographic changes in the city. Besides the local people, the neighborhood 
hosts migrants from all around the country coming to Lüleburgaz for various reasons. 
At this point, it is important to note that the neighborhood is becoming more and more 
popular among the migrants, because the housing in the city center has already belong 
to the local people and the migrants' housing needs have been met by the newly 
constructed housing developments in the neighborhood. Among these migrants, there 
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are both Kurdish and non-Kurdish migrants. According to the muhtar of the 
neighborhood, the migrants constitute 35% of the overall population in 8 Kasım. Unlike 
Durak neighborhood, the neighborhood has a mixed population. In other words, local 
people, non-Kurdish migrants and Kurdish migrants live together in the same buildings 
and/or on the same streets. There is no segregated area belonging to a specific ethnic 
group. 
 
4.2 Sampling Procedure 
 
To select the participants, in each neighborhood, only Kurdish and Turkish local 
residents were reached because the scope of this study is limited to the intergroup 
relations between Kurdish and local Turkish residents. Also, people at the voting age 
were selected as participants. 
Snowball sampling procedure was used to decide the samples. Neuman (2006) 
describes snowball sampling as follows: “A nonrandom sample in which the researcher 
begins with one case, and then based on information about interrelationships from that 
case, identifies other cases, and repeats the process again and again” (p. 223). The 
primary reason for choosing this method was to eliminate the risk of contacting wrong 
respondents who are out of the limits of this study. 
Gatekeepers were also of great help for reaching the correct respondents. There 
were four people who served as gatekeepers during the conduction of the interviews. 
They were all the residents of either Durak or 8 Kasım neighborhoods. One of them 
was a 38-year-old Kurdish resident living in the 8 Kasım neighborhood. The first 
contact with him occurred though my father. He helped me reach the Kurdish residents 
living in 8 Kasım. The other person who helped me in 8 Kasım neighborhood was a 29-
year-old local Turkish resident living there. He is a friend of mine from high-school. As 
for the Durak neighborhood, I got help from a member of ODP (Freedom and 
Democracy Party) to reach the Kurdish residents living in the isolated area. He was a 
former resident of that neighborhood, but he was not living in the segregated part then 
as he is a local people of Lüleburgaz. At first, I had a Kurdish gatekeeper from another 
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neighborhood, Sevgi neighborhood. She was a former resident of Durak as well. 
However, she gave up helping me because she thought that it was too risky to go there 
and ask identity-related questions in a pre-election atmosphere. She also informed me 
that another woman had visited the Kurdish population in that segregated area about a 
year before. She had asked questions about the environment and Ergene River, i.e. 
nothing related to politics, etc. However, the people found out that she was a KCK 
(Kurdistan Communities Union)26 and this caused fear around the neighborhood. Last 
but not least, my cousin lives in Durak, so he was my gatekeeper to reach the local 
Turkish residents.  
The common features of the respondents is being from either 8 Kasım or Durak 
neighborhood, and being either from the local or Kurdish population. Also, their 
income levels are much or less the same to eliminate the difference that may arise as a 
result of class difference instead of ethnic difference. Other features such as age, 
gender, political view, etc. vary from respondent to respondent. Thus, the study does 
not risk repeating and limiting the data to the perceptions reflecting the same political 
view, age group, etc. In this respect, snowball sampling provided the interview with the 
opportunity to reach people from different backgrounds. 
 
4.2.1 Sample Characteristics 
 
Interviews are conducted with a total of 20 respondents. 10 of them are 8 Kasım 
residents and the other 10 are Durak residents. In accordance with the Turkish and 
Kurdish division, 5 of the respondents are Kurdish residents and 5 of them is local 
Turkish residents in each neighborhood. The ethnicity and nativity of the respondents 
was determined upon self-identification. 
The initial target for the sampling size was 40 respondents in total. However, 
towards the end of the interview period, it was seen that people were getting nervous 
due to the upcoming local elections. Upon the candidacy of a Kurdish resident for 
                                               
26
  Defined as “the the urban wing of the PKK" at http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/courts-refuses-to-
release-kck-suspects.aspx?pageID=238&nID=63725&NewsCatID=341 [Accessed: November 15, 
2013]. 
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muhtarlık at Durak neighborhood, the atmosphere became tenser, so it was determined 
that continuing to conduct interviews were getting more difficult and insecure. In order 
to be sure about stopping the interviews, the data was checked in terms of saturation 
level. When it was observed that the samples are diverse enough to reflect the required 
points, the conduction of interview was stopped. A brief information is presented below 
regarding the characteristics of the samples per neighborhood. 
 
4.2.1.1.Local Residents of Durak Neighborhood 
 
Nickname of 
the Sample 
Age Education Occupation 
Ali 27 High-school graduate Blue collar worker 
Orhan 50 Primary school 
graduate 
Retired blue collar 
worker 
Gizem 44 High-school graduate Blue collar worker 
Gonca 57 College degree Retired white 
collar worker 
Umut 62 College degree Retired white 
collar worker 
 
Table 3.1 Local Residents of Durak Neighborhood 
All of the interviews were conducted in the houses of the respondents. Among 
these respondents, Gizem’s family migrated to Turkey from Bulgaria during the Balkan 
Wars. She does not identify herself as “Bulgarian Turk” though. All of these people 
live in detached houses with gardens. Orhan thinks that intergroup conflict is more 
likely to occur in apartment buildings as they have to enter/exit their apartments by 
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using a common building door. He believes that detached houses help people leave the 
problems with other people outside of their houses. 
4.2.1.2 Local Residents of 8 Kasım Neighborhood 
 
Nickname of the 
Sample 
Age Education Occupation 
Kemal 30 High-school graduate Blue collar 
worker 
Mert 28 College degree Self-employed 
Nesrin 54 High-school graduate Housewife 
Olcay 28 Associate degree Blue collar 
worker 
Sonay 25 High-school graduate Housewife 
 
Table 3.2 Local Residents of 8 Kasım Neighborhood 
 
Three of the interviews were conducted at home while the interviews with Sonay 
and Kemal were conducted at a cafe. 
Olcay served as a ranger in the army as part of his compulsory military service. I 
will not mention his place of duty due to privacy concerns, but he stated that he had 
involved in armed conflict during his service. He says that in the Eastern regions, 
Turkish people are excluded by the Kurdish local people living there, just like Kurds 
are excluded by the Turkish local people in the West. Therefore, he believes that the 
resolution process of Kurdish question should definitely involve the citizens. According 
to him, true and sustainable peace is possible when “Turks are not seen as enemies 
when wandering around the Kurdish cities in the East”. However, as it is seen in the 
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analysis chapter, he thinks that Kurds should conform to the lifestyle of the West if they 
want to live there. 
 
4.2.1.3 Kurdish Residents of Durak Neighborhood 
 
Nickname 
of the 
Sample 
Age Education Occupation Lives in 
Lüleburga
z since... 
Ayla 18 High-school 
graduate 
Housewife Birth 
Berkin 31 High-school 
graduate 
Blue collar 
worker 
1990 
Emel 22 High-school 
graduate 
Housewife 2011 
Ethem 56 Primary school 
graduate 
Self-employed 1975 
Gülten 45 Never been to 
school 
Housewife 1994 
 
Table 3.3 Kurdish Residents of Durak Neighborhood 
 
All of the interviews conducted at home. Gülten and Emel migrated to 
Lüleburgaz after they got married. Their husband were in Lüleburgaz back then, they 
had come to Lüleburgaz before their wives. Berkin migrated to Lüleburgaz with his 
family when he was 7. He states that his family had wanted to protect them from the 
terror. 
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Ethem is an ex-blue collar worker. He migrated to Lüleburgaz when he was a 
farmer in Iğdır. He worked as a construction worker. Later, he saved enough money to 
build a home for his family and start his own business. 
In addition, all of these Kurdish residents are from Iğdır. In fact, majority of the 
Kurdish population in this segregated area is from Iğdır and they are somehow related 
to one another with complex relative ties. I tried to reach to residents from other cities 
such as Malatya, Adıyaman, etc. but they did not accept to participate in this study. I 
observed that Iğdırlı people have a control over the neighborhood and the other 
residents hesitate to speak because of them. 
 
4.2.1.4 Kurdish Residents of 8 Kasım Neighborhood 
 
Nickname 
of the 
Sample 
Age Education Occupation Lives in 
Lüleburgaz 
since... 
Ahmet 31 High-school 
graduate 
Blue collar 
worker 
1986 
Bahar 38 Primary school 
graduate 
Housewife 2003 
Gülsüm 40 Primary school 
graduate 
Housewife 2006 
Rıza 56 College degree White collar 
worker 
1994 
Pelin 25 High-school 
graduate 
Housewife 2007 
 
Table 3.1 Kurdish Residents of 8 Kasım Neighborhood 
Ahmet is from Mardin. First, his father came to Lüleburgaz in the beginning of 
1980s and then he moved his whole family into Lüleburgaz. At first, they settled in 
Durak neighborhood but moved away from there after they had enough money to buy a 
house in 8 Kasım. 
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Similarly, Bahar and her husband settled in Durak neighborhood when they first 
arrived in Lüleburgaz. Bahar's and her husband’s families are from Ağrı but she was 
born in Istanbul. She has not seen Ağrı so far. They migrated to Lüleburgaz to escape 
from the family issues in Istanbul. 
Pelin is from Ağrı as well. She came to Lüleburgaz when she was married for 1 
year. They settled in 8 Kasım as soon as they arrived. She states that they did not want 
to live in Durak as a newly married couple because there are many elderly relatives 
there. 
The other male respondent, Rıza is from Dersim. During the interview, he used 
the name "Tunceli" though. I realized this weeks after the interview and contacted him 
again just to ask the reason for his preference. His response was:  
 
“I went through lots of things as a person from the 78 generation. I has to migrate to 
Germany. Then, I came here. I hardly remember my hometown as I have never been 
there since I left for Germany. Now, I have a great family. I have two smart children. 
Finally I have found peace. I do not want to risk it by taking a wrong step. You know, 
Dersim sounds very political” 
 
Another noteworthy thing about Rıza is that he places his Alawite identity in front of 
his Kurdish identity. He says that Alawism is a culture, a lifestyle as a belief system but 
that Kurdishness does not have the same function. 
 
4.3 Data Collection 
 
This study employs the use of less structured, in-depth interview methodology in 
gathering information about the intergroup relations and perceptions in the selected 
neighborhoods. 
Interview method was chosen because it provides the opportunity to draw out 
extensive information through open ended questions. Open-ended questions also 
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provide the respondents with “freedom to answer the questions using their own words” 
(Guion et. al., 2011:1); hence, offering a more in-depth understanding of their 
perceptions. 
The form of interview used in this paper is semi-structured. This means although 
a set of questions is pre-planned for guidance purposes, the interview is conversational 
in general allowing follow-up questions and "flowing from previous responses when 
possible" (ibid., 1).  
All of the interviews, except for Kemal (8 Kasım) and Sonay (8 Kasım) was 
conducted at home. Kemal preferred to meet me at a cafe, as I was sick and he has a 
little child. As his house is stove-heated, it was impossible to conduct the interview in 
another room. Also, I met Sonay at a cafe because she was not staying at her own home 
at that time. She had recently gave birth to a baby. Thus, she was staying with her 
family to get help from her mother. The average duration of the interviews is 20-30 
minutes.   
 
4.3.1 Interview Questions 
 
The main aim of the interview questions (see Appendix 4 and 5 for the lists of 
interview questions) was to explore the nature of the intergroup relationships between 
the Turkish local residents and Kurdish residents and to see whether social contact has 
any effect on the perceptions of these groups about each other. With this aim, the first 
thing that I tried to understand was the self-categorization of the people. Accordingly, 
the first questions I asked to both local and Kurdish residents was “Could you please 
introduce yourself?”, “How would you define your identity?”. Because local people 
repeatedly defined themselves as Lüleburgazlı, I also asked them the question "Who 
can be considered/accepted as Lüleburgazlı?”  
The second set of questions was related to their perceptions about Lüleburgaz in 
general. I asked them what they think about life in Lüleburgaz. When this question was 
directed to the local people, the aim was to explore whether they would mention the 
increasing number of migrants and related issues. And when it was asked to the 
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Kurdish residents, the aim was to explore whether they would mention the difficulties 
they had as Kurds. I used this question and the related probe questions to open a 
conversation about migration-related issues upon their responses instead of directing 
them to the issue by myself.  
To the Kurdish migrants, my third question was “Why did you choose this 
city/neighborhood to live in?” to understand their stories as well as the factors that 
bring them together in Durak/lead them live in 8 Kasım. Also, they were asked about 
their hometown and the reason for migration. 
On the other hand, the third question directed at the local people was "Who lives 
in this neighborhood?". With this question, I wanted to see whether they are aware of 
the other groups living in their neighborhood. Nesrin from 8 Kasım, for example, was 
not aware of the Kurdish population in her neighborhood. She shares her opinions 
about the Kurdish migrants in Lüleburgaz in general, but answered the question about 
the intergroup relationships in the neighborhood with regards to her opinions about the 
migrants from the Black Sea region. Remembering about the ‘imagined contact’ 
mentioned in the literature review of this study, I transformed my question for her as 
follows: 
 
“Imagine that you encounter a Kurdish person living in this neighborhood...” 
“How would you feel if you had a Kurdish family living next door?” 
 
She answered these question based on her imagination, but she also shared her 
interaction experiences at the school of her children (with the parents of Kurdish 
students), at the supermarket (Kurdish speaking people that she has encountered). 
The next question for the local respondents was “What do you think/how do you 
feel about the migrations to Lüleburgaz?” At this stage, I did not mention the Kurdish 
migrants in order to avoid from a guided interview. Instead, I wait for their answer and 
it provides me with data about their perceptions with regards to other groups – 
Bulgarian Turks, Roma people, migrants from the Black Sea region and migrants from 
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the nearby villages – as well. That way, I could figure out the social hierarchy that they 
have constructed in relation with the social categories in the city. 
Their mention of the migrants from the nearby villages was another additional 
benefit of asking open-ended questions in the interview. Before starting the interviews, 
I was thinking that they would limit the outgroups to the migrants coming from outside 
the Thrace region. Exclusion of rural migrants from the Lüleburgazlı ingroup was 
something I did not expect. 
As for the Kurdish respondents, the next question was “Have you ever faced 
difficulties in Lüleburgaz because of your identity as a Kurdish person?”. If their 
response to this question is affirmative, then I asked them the following question: “In 
your opinion, what are the root causes of these difficulties/problems?”. 
The questions regarding the intergroup relationships were almost the same for 
both groups. The first question in this sense was a more general question: “How do 
evaluate the intergroup relationship between the migrants and the local people?" When 
I was asking this question to the local people, I avoided from referring to the Kurdish 
migrants at the first place. I wanted to see if they thought about other groups as well or 
immediately started to talk about Kurdish migrants and their influence in the city. I 
referred to the Kurdish migrants only after they mentioned Kurds and their perceptions 
about them. The other question about the intergroup relationships was related to their 
perceptions about the relationship in a narrower setting, i.e. their neighborhood.  
The last part of questions aimed at discovering the presence/absence of intergroup 
contact and the effects of contact on their perceptions. While doing this, I did not focus 
merely on the direct contact. In accordance with the literature review presented in this 
study, I asked questions oriented towards examining the effects of indirect contact as 
well. For example, I asked the local respondents whether TV series, movies about the 
life in the Eastern regions had any influence on their perceptions. In addition, I asked 
them about how they feel/what they think about their friends or family members who 
have Kurdish friends. For two cases, Mert from 8 Kasım and Nesrin from 8 Kasım, I 
asked questions that were constructed to understand the effects of imagined contact. 
Also, I asked both local and Kurdish respondents whether their perception had changed 
after the contact situation. 
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During the interviews, I took care of conforming to the discourse of the 
respondent. For example, if the respondent referred to Kurds as "the Easterners", I kept 
using "the Easterners" as well in order no to cause discomfort. However, I also tried to 
understand why they avoid from using the word “Kurdish” and asked relevant 
questions. 
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CHAPTER 5:  ANALYSIS 
 
 
 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to summarize the thoughts and concerns of the 
people with excerpts from the interviews and to analyze their perceptions about ingroup 
and outgroup relations.  
The chapter is composed of two sections in line with the two themes of the thesis 
(social categorizations and intergroup relations) researched through the interview 
questions. The reason for categorizing the data into sections is to provide a more 
organized view on the perceptions of the interviewees. However, these sections are 
further divided into subsections to present the views of locals and the Kurdish 
population separately. In this sense, each section includes two parts; one containing the 
reflections of local people regarding the theme, and the other the reflections of the 
Kurdish residents. 
 
5.1 Social Categorizations and Perceptions 
 
5.1.1 Local Residents 
 
5.1.1.1 Self-Identification 
 
To begin with, local residents of both Durak and 8 Kasım neighborhoods 
highlight “being Lüleburgazlı” as a group identity throughout the interviews. They 
continuously compare Lüleburgazlı people as a group with the migrants from Anatolia 
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or nearby villages. For these residents, being Lüleburgazlı means being educated, 
urbanite, secular in terms of religion and having a high-income. They make a 
distinction between themselves and people coming from nearby villages based on their 
urbanite characteristics. They also place themselves in a different category than “the 
Anatolians”, the term they use to refer to both the Kurdish and non-Kurdish migrants 
from Anatolia. According to them, they differ from the Anatolians in terms of having 
high education levels as well as religious freedom they enjoy. 
The stereotypes they attain to Lüleburgazlı people represent their reflections 
about their ingroup more clearly: 
 
“Lüleburgazlı people are good. They are kind-hearted and friendly” (Ali, 27 – Durak) 
 
“Lüleburgaz is a modern city. There are educated people here.” (Gonca, 57 – Durak) 
 
“They are free and easy-going” (Gizem, 44 – Durak) 
 
“We are more free, I guess. We are more friendly. We like to include the people around 
us like a family.” (Sonay, 25 – 8 Kasım) 
 
“We live here in a more civilized way (...) We have high income” (Nesrin, 54 – 8 
Kasım) 
 
“(...) they [migrants from Anatolia] believe that girls should not have education or go 
out, girls should cover their head and they do not have right to speak... However, it is 
not like that for us; everyone of us is independent and can express our ideas freely...” 
(Olcay, 28 – 8 Kasım) 
 
The key expressions in these excerpts, which are “good, modern, educated, free, 
civilized, high income, independent”-  summarize the stereotypical characteristics 
attributed to Lüleburgazlı people. Moreover, they tell us around which factors 
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Lüleburgazlı identity takes shape. First of all, it is apparent that Lüleburgaz as a place is 
an important part of their self-identification as they name their identity after the city. 
Dixon and Durrheim already explain this as: “questions of `who we are’ are often 
intimately related to questions of `where we are” (2000:27). On the other hand, it is also 
apparent that the meaning they attribute to Lüleburgazlı identity goes far beyond being 
a place identity, it also serves to exclude non-urban people with lower income and 
education from their ingroup. In other words, Lüleburgazlı identity represents an 
identity with high levels of urbanity, education and income levels as well as Turkish 
ethnicity. 
Actually, local respondents also refer to Lüleburgazlı culture as an identifier of 
their identity. Here, Lüleburgaz culture refers to a lifestyle with high level of urbanity, 
individualization, secularism, income as well as being less traditional lifestyle. This is 
reflected in the expressions of some of the local people as well. Gonca (57 – Durak), 
for example, complains that she has few friends in the neighborhood although she tries 
a lot to approach the rural migrants (from the nearby villages). She explains the 
difficulty she has experienced in becoming friends with the rural migrants with the 
following: 
 
“I try to have a conversation with them. I visit them, I try to talk to them. However, 
what can I share with them? There is a cultural difference between me and those 
neighbors from the village. They are less educated, conservative... We are not 
culturally compatible with each other.” 
 
Some other respondents also have the same perception with Gonca. According to 
them, Lüleburgaz culture represents a class with higher status and they assume that they 
are culturally different from even the nearby cities such as Babaeski and even the 
province Kırklareli. For example, Gizem (44 – Durak) defines the culture of nearby 
villages and cities as “wholly another culture”. Ali (27 – Durak) clarifies this difference 
with the following words: “They have a rural culture because they are not as 
industrialized as Lüleburgaz and they still have some old, rural customs27.” 
                                               
27
  “Köylü âdetleri” 
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Last but not least, Lüleburgazlı identity has a more impermeable dimension as 
well. Some of the local people argue that Turkishness also matters in relation with their 
identity. We see that clearly in their expressions with regards to Roma population in the 
city. Roma people also form a native population group in Lüleburgaz, i.e. they are part 
of the urban population. Yet, expressions of some of the local people show that they are 
excluded from Lüleburgazlı ingroup. Sonay (25 – 8 Kasım), for instance, highlights the 
status of Roma population by sharing her opinions about their involvement in the city 
activities. Her expressions reflect the exclusion of Roma people from local group of 
people: 
 
“Roma people here (...) think that they are very important. They believe that we should 
conform to them. They act first28 in everything. Therefore, the local people of 
Lüleburgaz cannot participate in anything. For example, when there is a concert, you 
see Roma people there. Few Turkish people, local people can go there. You cannot feel 
comfortable here because of them.” 
 
Similarly, Olcay's (28 – 8 Kasım) mention of Roma people offers the same 
exclusion. He responds the question about his opinion about the status of Roma people 
in Lüleburgaz with the following: 
 
“They have their own neighborhoods. (...) Of course, give a dog a bad name and hang 
him29. They committed theft back in the days. (...) Those people have been excluded 
since before now. (...) They have been labeled as ‘burglars’. And they have given up 
mingling with the local people.” 
 
In this example, Olcay does not only accept the social discrimination against the Roma 
people, but also by his expression “mingling with the local people”, he shows that he 
does not see them as “local people”. 
To sum up, Lüleburgazlı identity is a multi-dimensional identity based on place, 
class and ethnicity. It includes being urban, Turkish, native of Lüleburgaz as well as in 
                                               
28
  “Her şeyde ilk onlar davranıyorlar” 
29
  “Tabii bir insanın adı dokuza çıktıysa sekize inmez diye var ya…” 
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an economically good position. It is interesting to see how the construction of this 
identity on the basis of these dimensions is in parallel with theories of social identity. 
At the end of the day, these dimensions and the Lüleburgazlı stereotypes attained 
accordingly by these local people serve to achieve a positive distinctiveness from the 
other groups. 
What is more, local people also strive for maintaining this positive social identity 
and high status through showing ingroup favoritism. They show it through their 
tendency to excuse the behavior of their ingroup members, which they evaluate as a 
negative characteristic when performed by outgroup members. To put it more clearly, 
they criticize migrants who favor other migrants at workplaces; yet, they complain that 
Lüleburgazlı people do not favor one another sufficiently. For example, Olcay (28 – 8 
Kasım) complains that “the people coming from the East” favor each other especially in 
the work places. However, when he is asked about his opinion about the kahvehanes30 
where men tend to form groups based on their home village or based on local versus 
migrant distinctions, he replies that it is normal for people to prefer the kahvehanes 
owned by local people adding that “they may want their own people earn money”. In 
this case, ingroup favoritism is seen acceptable for local people although they perceive 
it as a sign of exclusion and/or “withdrawing into their shell” (Olcay, 28 – 8 Kasım) 
when performed by the Kurdish people. 
Similarly, Ali (27 – Durak) criticizes the Easterner employers for favoring the 
Easterner workers, but complains that Lüleburgazlı people do not favor each other like 
that. In another words, what is seen as a sign of “isolation”, “grouping” and 
“withdrawing into one’s shell” when it comes to the Kurdish residents, is declared as a 
kind of “cooperation” when it is about Lüleburgazlı people. 
So far, I have tried to understand the self-categorization of local people as well as 
the basis of the identity that they have constructed. The research shows that there is no 
difference between Durak or 8 Kasım neighborhoods on how they see being 
Lüleburgazlı. In this regard, it is possible to talk about a mostly accepted common 
identity as none of the respondents differs in terms of self-definition, stereotypes that 
he/she attains to his/her ingroup and his/her concern about the positive social identity. 
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  Coffeehouses specific to men. 
66 
 
Altogether, one difference between the locals of two neighborhoods in question 
should be noted with regards to the salience of the aforementioned identity dimensions. 
It is seen that there is a difference in terms of reference to ethnic dimension – 
Turkishness. Local residents of Durak refer to Turkishness as their primary identities at 
the earlier stages of the interview, i.e. as a direct response to the questions of how they 
define themselves. However, only one out of five respondents in 8 Kasım mentions 
Turkishness at first. This respondent, Kemal (30 – 8 Kasım), accepts Turkishness as a 
supra-identity which covers all the ethnic identities in Turkey as well as the ethnic 
Turkish people living in the Middle Asia. For all the other respondents, Turkishness as 
a dimension of ingroup identity comes to surface as a result of comparison of ingroup 
with the Kurdish group rather than as a direct response to identity question. For 
example, Sonay (25 – 8 Kasım) mentions Turkishness for the first time when talking 
about an incident when Kurds burnt a Turkish flag in Durak neighborhood. She refers 
to this incident as an “attack to her values”. Similarly, Mert (28 – 8 Kasım) mentions 
Turkishness after he is asked whether he prefers any other identity to define himself 
following his statements regarding being Lüleburgazlı and Thracian: 
 
Interviewer: Could you please introduce yourself? How do you define your identity? 
Mert: I am 28 years old. I live in Lüleburgaz. I am a Lüleburgazlı.... 
Interviewer: In your opinion, who can be regarded as Lüleburgazlı? 
Mert: People who are born and live in this city. 
Interviewer: Are there certain characteristics that define a Lüleburgazlı? 
Mert: Thracian culture, Balkan culture... 
(...)  
Interviewer: Are there any other elements that you use to define yourself except for 
Lüleburgaz, job, age, etc. I mean this may be a national identity, ethnic identity... 
Mert: Just Turkish. 
 
Stets and Burke’s explanation of salience hierarchy helps us interpret this 
difference between two neighborhoods: “A salient identity is an identity that is likely to 
be played out (activated) frequently across different situations” (2003:135). Indeed, the 
main difference between two neighborhoods, is that the residential segregation in 
Durak may be considered as an activating factor for ethnic identity. According to 
Lederach, “(...) people seek security by identifying with something close to their 
experience” (1997:13). Likewise, Hornsey (2008) points out that the accessibility of a 
category is important in terms self-definition. In the case of Durak, one can assume that 
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the geographical segregation results in a spontaneous “Kurds vs. Turks” differentiation. 
Hence, ethnicity becomes more accessible and a part of everyday experience. To put it 
in a different way, residential segregation may create ethnically marked zones and 
social contexts in which people comprehend their identity relative to others in terms of 
ethnicity more easily. Still, a more comprehensive study, such as a questionnaire 
including questions about other possible factors like ideology, which would be applied 
to a larger population, might provide a more accurate answer regarding this difference. 
 
5.1.1.2 Outgroup Perceptions 
 
Local residents put the emphasis on cultural differences, stereotypes and 
accommodation to local setting when talking about outgroups. Their perceptions and 
attitudes seem to change in accordance with these factors and this creates a social 
hierarchy in the city. When we have a holistic view of this hierarchy, we see that the 
basis of their stance is social and ethnic identity, indeed. The place of each outgroup is 
seen to be determined in accordance with the preferences of local people which are 
shaped as per social and ethnic similarity. In that way, local people do not only justify 
their dominant position in the society, they also determine the positions of the relevant 
outgroups. 
First of all, migrants from nearby villages and other cities of Thracian region are 
at the top of the hierarchy. As all of the respondents distinguish between the Thrace and 
the East, this migrant group is considered closer to the ingroup. Kemal (30 – 8 Kasım) 
expresses this regional differentiation as follows: “For us, beyond Istanbul is the East. 
The difference between the West and the East is not taught to us, we define it this way 
by ourselves.” 
Although this statement seems to make merely a geographical distinction, other 
respondents’ discourses regarding ‘the East’ show that there is a connection between 
the regional differentiation they make and their ethnic perspectives. This assumption is 
confirmed by Mert (28 – 8 Kasım) who reveals the association of regional and ethnic 
differences in his mind: 
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“Ethnic identity is something regional. In Turkey, regions are different from each other 
in terms of race. For example, people in the Black Sea region are Laz, the Easterners 
are Kurdish...” 
 
At this point, it would be helpful to remember the history of the Kurdish question 
in Turkey in order to interpret the reference to ‘the East’ as a region and to 'the 
Easterners’ as an outgroup identity correctly. For years, the state discourse in Turkey 
regarding the Kurdish question had centered on the avoidance from using the word 
“Kurdish”. Instead, the conflict was seen as the problem of ‘the East’, i.e. 
underdevelopment and lack of investment in the region (Yeğen, 2007). In this way, the 
Turkish state avoided from recognizing Kurds as an ethnic minority and addressing the 
conflict accordingly. We see a mere reflection of this discourse in the words of the local 
people of Lüleburgaz. Umut (62 – Durak), for example, argues the following: 
 
“People talk about the ‘Kurdish question’. The Southeastern region has problems in 
general, and not all the people living in the Southeastern and Eastern regions are 
Kurdish. Dadaş people31 do not stand out and say that “there is a Dadaş question” but 
Kurds do, because they want to have control over the region”. 
 
Similarly, Orhan (50 – Durak) and Mert (28 – 8 Kasım) think that ethnic identity 
is a recently emerging topic. Both of them believe that highlighting the ethnic identities 
has a political purpose and they do not approve it as it is understood from the 
following: 
 
“This is all about political purposes. If the politicians did not bring ethnic identity into 
question, the citizens would not think about it. (...) They should not bring the issue into 
question as the ‘Kurdish question’. They should bring social services to the East. (...) 
Now, they talk about the Kurdish-Turkish brotherhood, peace... Which peace? Bring 
service to Kurds, to the East... So that they do not migrate here from the East. They do 
not use weapon anymore, once they have good living standards. There is no conflict 
                                               
31
  A term referring to the local people of Erzurum. 
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between Kurds and Turks, but the politicians try to make it seem as such.(...) This 
political attitude has ignited the tension between people.” (Orhan, 50 – Durak) 
 
“People have recently begun to talk about ethnic identities. Before, people in 
Lüleburgaz did not ask one another about their ethnic identities and ethnic identities 
were not known. The politicians have caused this segregation. They have segregated 
people into ethnic groups. They invented something called ‘sub-identity and supra-
identity” (Mert, 28 – 8 Kasım) 
 
During the interviews, there were also some occasions where I observed that 
people became uncomfortable with the usage of the term “Kurdish”. I conducted the 
interviews with Kemal (30 – 8 Kasım) and Sonay (25 – 8 Kasım) in a cafe. In the case 
of Kemal, I asked him to whom he referred by the term ‘the Easterner’. Instead of 
giving a direct answer to my question, he mentioned the geographical distinction 
between the Thrace and the East. Than, he referred to Kurdish identity as a sub-identity 
but every time he uttered the word “Kurdish”, he lowered his voice. Likewise, Sonay 
got uncomfortable when I deliberately used the word “Kurds” during the interview to 
see her reaction. She immediately looked around to make that nobody around had heard 
me. Later, she admitted that she did not want the people around us think that we were 
talking about something related to “the terrorists”. Other interviews were carried out at 
home, so people were relatively more relaxed with hearing the word “Kurds”. 
However, they still did not prefer to use it. Gonca (57 – Durak) and Ali (27 – Durak) 
said that the use of “Kurds” made the issue “too political”32. The reactions and 
reflections of these respondents tell us that they avoid referring to Kurdishness not only 
to avoid recognizing Kurdish identity and rights, but also because of the link they 
perceive to exist between the PKK and Kurds. 
Turning back to the top position of rural migrants from Thracian cities and 
villages in the social hierarchy constructed by the locals, we see that there are two 
factors determining this position. One of them is the feeling of security local people 
perceive in comparison to the ethnically different migrants. Sonay's (25 – 8 Kasım) 
comparison between her childhood and present time is just an example which reflects 
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  “Konuyu çok siyasi yapıyor” 
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the difference perceived between the migrations from the nearby villages and the East 
in terms of security: 
“In that neighborhood [where she grew up], there are mostly people from the nearby 
villages. My childhood passed there. (...) We grew up on the streets. However, such 
thing [playing in the streets] is not possible today. Could I let my child go out and play 
on the streets now? I cannot trust [let my child go out on his/her own] even in that 
neighborhood (...) This is related to the excessive migration. As the employment 
opportunities are limited in the East, I guess people have come here..." 
 
When we consider this reflection together with Sonay’s aforementioned concern 
about the use of the word “Kurdish”, it becomes clear that the link she perceives 
between the PKK and Kurds leads to a feeling of threat. Therefore, Kurds are less 
preferable as neighbors than the other migrant groups for Sonay. 
The other factor is cultural similarity. According to Gizem (44 – Durak), the 
migrants from other Thracian cities and villages are very different from Lüleburgazlı 
people as they have rural tastes33 and styles but it is easier to get along with them as 
they are more similar to them in terms of traditions34. 
From the perspective of the local people, Bulgarian immigrants are the second in 
terms of cultural and social closeness. For example, Olcay (28 – 8 Kasım) answers a 
question about whether he has the same opinion for both the Easterners and the 
Bulgarian immigrants as follows: 
 
“No, I do not. With the migration from Bulgaria, maybe Turkey has improved a little 
more. Those people have a European perspective. When they first came here, people 
opposed them. For example, women had not worked at the factories before they came. 
(...) They have changed this view. I mean they did a good thing.” 
 
                                               
33
  “Köylü zevki” 
34
  Indeed, this response also supports the above mentioned interpretation of cultural dimension of 
Lüleburgazlı identity. Once again, it is seen that the locals’ mention of culture serves to highlight 
their urban characteristics and superiority in terms of education and income. It does not refer to 
traditions, customs, etc.  
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He further elaborates his views by mentioning the cultural proximity of Bulgarian 
immigrants (Just like Gizem (44 – Durak), Olcay’s mention of culture is not the same 
as the meaning the attribute to Lüleburgazlı culture. Here, they point out to traditions 
whereas the cultural dimension of Lüleburgazlı identity represents their characteristics 
as an urban class. He legitimizes the superiority of Bulgarian Turk residents over the 
Anatolian immigrants: 
 
“In terms of getting along, we are close to Bulgarian immigrants in all respects. We 
are close in terms of views, style, and we adapt to each other quickly. But it takes time 
or never happens with a person from the East. We cannot become friends in a short 
time". 
  
Another differentiation is made between people coming from the Black Sea 
region and the Kurdish people. It is seen that local people’s stance towards the people 
from Black Sea region is more positive than towards Kurds on average. Gonca (57 – 
Durak) says that “people coming from the Black Sea region can adapt themselves to 
here more quickly, they are not aggressive” like the Kurdish migrants. Similarly, we 
see the mention of aggressiveness in Gizem’s (44 – Durak) interview as well; she 
thinks that “the Easterners are hot-tempered compared to the people coming from the 
Black Sea region".  
According to Redmond (n.d.), dominant groups form social hierarchies and then 
produce discourses to justify the relevant positions of groups in that hierarchy. In this 
respect, the repeated emphasis on the aggressiveness of Kurdish people serves as a 
legitimizing myth to derogate Kurds as an outgroup. 
  
Redmond (ibid.) also points out that people apply different factors when 
positioning outgroups in the hierarchy. When we look at the social hierarchy 
constructed by the local people of Lüleburgaz from this point of view, we see that it 
reflects an order of outgroups based on cultural proximity, class
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First of all, they make a distinction between Turkish and non-Turkish groups. 
Then, they make a distinction among the upper three levels which includes Turkish 
groups. Migrants from the nearby villages and cities are placed in a higher position than 
the other two groups as they are the closest group to the local people in terms of 
cultural proximity. The second group is the Bulgarian Turks who are culturally more 
distant than the migrants from nearby villages. However, they are seen more urbanite 
than the migrants from the Black Sea region, hence placed higher than them. Migrants 
from the Black Sea region are seen as “rural” as argued by Gonca (57 – Durak), Nesrin 
(54 – 8 Kasım) and Gizem (44 – Durak) due to their conservative lifestyle and dressing. 
At the bottom of the hierarchy, we see Roma people and Kurds, i.e. non-Turkish 
outgroups. At this stage, Roma people are placed higher than Kurds, because they are 
seen more favorable. For example, Olcay (28 – 8 Kasım) states the following: “They 
are not like the migrants coming from the East. They can mingle with the people, work, 
have conversation with the local people and they are clean" 
Also, they may be seen culturally closer to the local people as they are the natives 
of the same region. However, Kurds are seen culturally distant even though they were 
born in Lüleburgaz: 
"Kurds cannot speak like Lüleburgazlı people do, cannot behave like Lüleburgazlı 
people do and cannot dress like Lüleburgazlı people do... Even if they are born in 
Lüleburgaz. They try to maintain their attitudes, behaviors and customs here in 
Lüleburgaz.” (Ali, 27 – Durak) 
 
However, he acknowledges that Roma people who have education and proper 
jobs can easily adapt to social life as they are already from that region. In the end, we 
see that within the major categorization as Turks versus non-Turks, categorization 
according to the above mentioned three factors is repeated in each level of minor levels. 
So, Roma people is placed higher than Kurds as they are considered to closer in terms 
of region and the social life there. In order to demonstrate this social hierarchy the 
effective factors in a more clear and simple way, a table is presented below. 
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Table 5.1 Social hierarchy in Lüleburgaz. 
 
5.1.1.1.1 Perceptions about the Kurdish Population 
 
The most emphasized characteristics that are attained to Kurdish migrants are the 
ones that relate Kurds with tribal and conservative lifestyle. In general, Kurds are 
described as people who perform kin marriage and dowry practices. They are also 
pictured as conservative people, thus, are culturally very different from the local 
people. The below excerpts, for instance, show the opinions of the local people with 
regards to the cultural differences between themselves and Kurds: 
 
“(...) their way of thinking, their lifestyles do not conform to us. Their actions are 
unfavorable for us. (...) And our life here – for example, when two boys take a walk 
with two girls – seems unfavorable to them; they interpret this directly in a different 
way, like “look, they are doing different [bad] things!”(Olcay, 28 – 8 Kasım) 
 
Interviewer: What do you think about the migrants? 
Mert: They increase the cultural diversity. They cannot adapt to here. 
Interviewer: You are talking about cultural diversity as a negative or a positive thing? 
Mert: Diversity as a negative thing. They cannot adapt themselves here, they mostly 
keep their own traditions. They cannot accommodate themselves to us. 
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Interviewer: Why do you think they cannot adapt? 
Mert: Family structure, religion... Things like that.” 
Interviewer: In what respects are these different from the structure, religion in 
Lüleburgaz? 
Mert: In Lüleburgaz, families care about education, they raise individuals. But the 
people migrating from there [the East] grow up in a culture of submissiveness.” 
 (Mert, 28 – 8 Kasım) 
 
“Those people [from the East] are weird people. For example, their women... When 
they see a man, they throw themselves into the house in order not to be seen. They do 
this even though they know that they will break their arm” (Ali, 27 – Durak)  
 
So, it is seen that the local people think that their lifestyle is judged by  the 
conservative migrants and found ‘unfavorable’. Also, Mert’s and Ali’s statements 
include derogative stereotypes – expressed through the words “submissiveness” and 
“weird” -which help them maintain their positive distinctiveness from Kurds. 
 
In addition, Kurds are seen as less modern and sometimes even less civilized than 
the local people. With that comparison, local people draw a more desirable picture of 
culture and life in Lüleburgaz: 
 
“Here, we live in a more civilized manner. We have more opportunities and 
investments here compared to the East. They [migrants] are already aware of this. This 
is why we do not go there [to the East], they come here.” (Nesrin, 54 – 8 Kasım) 
 
“A person from the East and a person who grew up in the West are not the same in 
terms of mentality. (...) Also, the [local] people do not talk like them, they talk modern 
Turkish. Of course, they may have difficulties in understanding each other” (Sonay, 25 
– 8 Kasım)  
 
It is seen that the stereotypes that are associated with Kurds are based on the 
contrasts between “the Civilized and the Barbarians” (Van Dijk, 2003:362). These 
contrasts help local people ensure a positive distinctiveness between their ingroup and 
75 
 
the Kurdish residents. The differences that they mention derogate the outgroup while 
maintaining positive ingroup identity. 
Apart from these, there are three more stereotypes which may serve directly for a 
social polarization. These include relating the Kurds with the PKK, endogamy and 
blaming them for living in a segregated area because of their bad intentions. For 
instance, Orhan (50 – Durak) talks about how any negative experience with the Kurdish 
residents are associated with the PKK by the local residents: 
 
“Isolated settlement of the Kurdish population causes restlessness35 [because] it is a 
Kurdish settlement. Any event is associated with the PKK. Even though people fight 
with each other [for personal reasons], the name of the PKK comes to the forefront”. 
In general, these sentences reflect the perceptions of the other local Durak 
residents as well. Any negative daily interaction quickly turns into a discussion over 
ethnic issues. In the case of Orhan’s statement above, it is seen that local people are 
already ready to blame Kurds with connection to the PKK due to any negative 
interaction. Nevertheless, Kurds are also ready to perceive any negative ordinary 
interaction as a sign of racism: 
 
“I saw him [Kurdish boy from the segregated zone] in our garden picking up peaches 
from our tree. I told him that it was inappropriate to enter our garden without 
permission. His response to me was: “This is not your garden. This is our land. Our 
grandfathers fought in the War of Independence to save these lands. Do not be a 
racist”. Gonca (57 – Durak) 
 
The second stereotype attained is endogamy. Almost all the local people mention 
the kin marriage, dowry and bride exchange practices when talking about the Kurdish 
culture. They state that these practices are "unacceptable by the local people” (Olcay, 
28 – 8 Kasım). With regards to intermarriage, Sonay (25 – 8 Kasım) thinks that the 
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  “Tedirginlik oluyor” 
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Easterner people prefer kin marriages because they are “selfish”36 and do not accept 
outsiders into their families. 
Similar reactions are also seen regarding the collective settlement of Kurds in 
Durak neighborhood. Local people perceive isolated settlement as a wish to exercise 
control over the neighborhood. Umut (62 – Durak) explains this in a clear way: 
 
“They do not want to live separately in anywhere. They call one another. They may be 
afraid of failing to exercise control if they live as individual families. If they move into 
the city center they will get lost; not in terms of their customs, but in terms of child 
raising style. Also, they cannot stand out and say “I am Kurdish”, if they live as 1 or 2 
families. They live collectively in order not to be oppressed. They do not want the name 
of their race to vanish” 
 
Orhan (50 – Durak) associates this collective settlement to the tribal culture of 
Kurdish people and believes that they would not accept local people into their 
segregated area since “they are the majority” in that side. In addition, Mert (28 – 8 
Kasım) thinks that Kurds live collectively because they see themselves as a separate 
community. In his opinion, other people do not need such a feeling of unity as they are 
the people who form the nation, but Kurds do not feel themselves as part of the Turkish 
nation. Regardless of the slight differences in their expressions related to the segregated 
settlement of Kurds, they all perceive this as a threat. They feel as if Kurds have built 
their autonomous region in that area and they feel uncomfortable considering the 
difficulty of controlling this group of Kurds in a segregated area. Ali (27 – Durak) 
states that it is wrong to let them live collectively by giving reference to Atatürk: 
 
“Atatürk said that Kurds should not be permitted to live side by side and should be 
[geographically] distributed" 
 
Unlike the religious and conservative stereotypes, these ones go beyond 
highlighting differences and blame Kurds for staying away from the people of the 
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nation and practicing “deviant traditions.” Van Dijk (2003:362) explains that this kind 
of blaming stereotypes fuels social conflict because “[s]ocial conflict is (...) cognitively 
represented and enhanced by polarization, and discursively sustained and reproduced 
by (...) demonizing”. 
 
5.1.1.3 Semantic shifts 
 
Throughout the interviews, it is observed that the local people tend to utter 
phrases like, “I do not have any problems with Kurds but....” when they are expressing 
their feelings and opinions about Kurds living in the city. Van Dijk (2003:261) calls 
this switch in the discourse as “semantic moves”. They start their sentences with 
phrases like: 
 
“Migrants enrich the culture...” (Gizem, 44 – Durak) 
“Personally they have no harm to me...” (Umut, 62 – Durak) 
 
then, with a little semantic move using “but”, they end like: 
 
“...but they have to accommodate themselves to where they go” (Gizem, 44 – Durak) 
“...but it bothers us that they behave so freely here” (Umut, 62 – Durak) 
 
Sometimes, this shift does not occur at the sentence level but can be observed at 
the discourse level. For example, in the below example, I give two examples from 
Kemal’s (30 – 8 Kasım) and Ali’s (27 – Durak) interviews. At the earlier stages of the 
interview, they use a milder discourse, i.e. they do not regard ethnicity, cultural 
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differences, etc. as important or they do not see Kurds as a threat. However, as the 
interview goes on, they start to reflect more negative perceptions and their expectation 
that Kurds should conform to their lifestyle. For example, Kemal says that different 
languages and colors are the creations of the God, so they are not disturbing for him. 
But later, he states that it is disturbing to encounter people from different regions or 
cultures when walking out in the city. Here are his statements at the earlier and later 
stages of the interview: 
 
BEFORE: “I believe that it is the God who creates the languages and colors, so I do 
not feel any attachment to any identity” 
LATER: “Think about this: you go to a workplace and a person who is not from you 
overranks you (...) and do not give you what you deserve. Or when you go out you 
encounter people who are not from your region, from your own culture and you have 
problems because of this”. (Kemal, 30 – 8 Kasım) 
 
Similarly, Ali admits that Kurds are not harmful to the local people but then 
points out to the harm they may cause to their values: 
 
BEFORE: “They have no harm to the local people” 
LATER: “First of all, they have to accept where they are. If they live in Lüleburgaz, 
they have to apply the traditions of Lüleburgaz. (...) They have to change their minds at 
the first place. Endogamy, refusing TC (acronym for Turkish Republic) and the flag; 
they should not act like this if they are here” (Ali, 27 – Durak) 
 
At first, these semantic moves and perception shifts seem as a discursive 
inconsistency. In fact, they are strategies to reveal one’s opinions and/or feelings 
without drawing much reaction with the negative expressions. First they utter a positive 
opinion and then they “correct” (Van Dijk, 1984:115) this opinion by building a 
negative sentence subsequently. Same as for negative stereotypes, these shifts serve to 
persuade the listener about the positive social identity of one’s ingroup. In other words, 
the positive expressions maintain the positive identity of the ingroup because they 
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disclaim the responsibility of local people in lack of communication, unpleasant 
experiences, etc. 
 
5.1.2 Kurdish Residents 
 
5.1.2.1 Self-Identification 
 
Kurdish residents from both neighborhoods identify themselves as Kurdish. In the 
case of the local residents, it was difficult for some people to understand the question 
about identity. Sometimes, the concept of identity was explained to them in more detail 
to help them understand what identity means. However, Kurdish residents did not need 
further explanation about the identity, except for one case where the woman was hardly 
speaking Turkish. My Kurdish gatekeeper (Enver, 38 – 8 Kasım) explains this as the 
following: 
 
“We always live aware of our identity because we face discrimination. Our identity has 
been politicized; even the political parties fight over it. So, even our children know 
what ‘identity’ means” 
 
Indeed, Kurdish people experience a more active group membership due to social 
and political reasons. Both their minority status in the city and the challenges they may 
experience in relation to this status, and their long-term political struggle with regards 
to their identity rights seem to reinforce their ingroup awareness. Therefore, they are 
generally ready for identity-related questions and presenting their identity. 
Despite their strong self-definition as Kurdish, some of them have a sense of 
belongingness to Lüleburgaz, as well. Here are some excerpts from the interviews of 
Kurdish residents who express belongingness or connection to Lüleburgaz: 
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“I have been living in Lüleburgaz since 1986. I have spent almost 26-27 years in the 
Thrace. Now, we can be considered as Thracians, as natives...” (Ahmet, 31 – 8 Kasım) 
 
“As I get used to [the city] in the course of time, I see Lüleburgaz as my hometown. (...) 
I feel as if I was born here” (Berkin, 31 – Durak) 
 
Interviewer: Do you feel that you belong to Lüleburgaz? 
Ayla (18, Durak): Of course! (...) I miss this city when I am in Istanbul. 
(...) 
Interviewer: You have grown up in Lüleburgaz, but you also visit Iğdır. How do you 
feel about Iğdır? 
Ayla: I do not like that city at all. Once I have been to the village there, it was very 
weird. There were trees everywhere... I could not stay there. I stayed one night and then 
returned. I could not stand... Once you get used to here, you cannot go there. 
 
“Now, I consider Lüleburgaz as a part of me. I cannot leave these people. (...) I have 
identified with this city [his wife confirms: We feel as strangers in Iğdır].” (Ethem, 56 – 
Durak) 
 
“I cannot say I am “Lüleburgazlı”, but there is at least a feeling of connection to here. 
I feel it”. (Bahar’s son, 19 – 8 Kasım) 
 
On the other hand, half of the respondents express no attachment to Lüleburgaz. 
Although they say that they are happy there, they do not have a sense of belonging. 
Therefore, the question is what may cause the difference between the feelings of these 
two groups. It is obvious that the feeling of attachment does not differ according to the 
neighborhood, age or gender. Among those with the feeling of attachment, there are 
residents from both Durak and 8 Kasım neighborhood. Also, they vary a lot in terms of 
age and date of arrival in Lüleburgaz.  
The variation in sense of attachment may be associated with the level and quality 
of intergroup contact. It is seen that all the Kurdish residents who express attachment to 
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Lüleburgaz have a higher level of social interaction with the local residents; they all 
mention good relationship with their local neighbors. All of the above mentioned 
residents with feeling of attachment have regular contacts with the local people at 
school, in the workplaces, etc. Ayla (18), for example, went to school in Lüleburgaz. 
Similarly, Bahar’s son (19) goes to school in Lüleburgaz and he has ‘local’ friends. 
Other Kurdish residents who have a sense of attachment are all men working in the city 
center. However, those who express no connection to the city are all housewives. One 
exception, Rıza (56 – 8 Kasım) states that he does not feel any connection to anywhere 
as he has changed a lot of places so far. 
Also, it is seen that positive contact experience has an important influence on the 
feeling of attachment. Gülten (45 – Durak), for instance, experienced a negative contact 
in the past. She says that a seller in the marker rejected to sell her the things she wanted 
to buy yelling at her as “go, learn Turkish first!” Consequently, she responds the 
question about attachment to the city as “Never!” On the contrary, Ayla (18 – Durak) 
who has a high level of attachment explains her experience as such: 
 
“There was one boy in our class in the middle school. Once, he said bad things about 
Kurds, but other Turkish friends did not support him. Instead, they excluded him from 
our friend group”. 
 
This issue regarding the social contact will be detailed further in the section 
related to the effects of social contact. For now, we can conclude by stating that identity 
awareness as Kurdish is very high among this group of respondents, but they differ in 
terms of sense of attachment to the city. Yet, even the lack of this sense is not in 
directly related to the outgroup perceptions which are presented in the following 
section. 
 
5.1.2.2 Perceptions about the Local Residents 
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To begin with, all of the Durak residents are content with living in an isolated 
area, because this enables them to maintain their traditions. They like that the 
segregated area looks like their home region with detached houses, chickens and cows, 
etc. None of them prefers living in the city center, as this may prevent them from 
exercising their own customs. What is more, they regard the Kurdish people who move 
away from that segregated area into mixed neighborhoods as alienated people. For 
example, one of the Kurdish residents expresses her resentment against the mother of a 
girl who has moved away to 8 Kasım neighborhood with her family: 
 
“Say hi to your mom! And tell her that she has forgotten about us. She has moved away 
into the Thracians, she does not appreciate us anymore. Is she ashamed of us?” (Zila, 
50 – Durak) 
 
Some of them express the pleasure they get out of living in the segregated are as 
follows: 
“[With regard to living in the isolated area in Durak neighborhood] All of them are 
Kurds. All of them are from our region. (...) This is very good.” (Gülten, 45 – Durak) 
 
“I have not felt as a stranger here [isolated area] because this area looks very much 
like our region. (...) There are mostly our relatives living here” (Emel, 22 – Durak) 
 
It is seen that Kurds living in this isolated Kurdish enclaves have developed a 
sense of place identity, just like the Lüleburgazlı people did with regards to the city 
itself. They have created an area suitable for the lifestyle they are accustomed to. At 
first, one may wonder if it is the security need that makes them live in such a collective 
manner without spreading all over the city. However, their perceptions about the 
Lüleburgazlı people reveal no such sense of insecurity. On the contrary, there are many 
positive stereotypes they attain to Lüleburgazlı people: 
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“We are content with the natives here. (...) 70% of the local people have no harm to 
anybody37, aren’t they?  They say “if nobody touches me, I will not touch anybody”. 
Therefore, we do not have any problems” (Ethem, 56 – Durak) 
 
“In my opinion, people living in Lüleburgaz are more forward thinking people. They 
are good-natured people. They accept the migrants quickly” (Ahmet, 31 – 8 Kasım) 
 
“What I like most about the Lüleburgazlı people is that they appreciate you when you 
work hard. (...) They give you a chance, they do not look at you with an evil eye. They 
embrace you. They are comfortable with that” (Berkin, 31 – Durak) 
 
“People behave very well, they are very sincere people. (...) People in our home town 
stare at you, they focus when they see a foreigner. People are not like that here, 
everybody is on his/her own. Nobody turns and stares at you saying “look, this is a 
foreigner”. (Emel, 22 – Durak) 
 
Another Kurdish resident, Ahmet (31) from 8 Kasım shares his experiences with 
the local people of Babaeski and Hayrabolu and states that they do not accept Kurdish 
people like Lüleburgazlı people do. Pelin (25 – 8 Kasım) states the same opinions about 
Babaeski people pointing out that they do not let Kurdish workers rent houses in the 
city. Emel (22 – Durak) makes the same comparison with the local people of Vize. She 
says that people of Vize did not welcome them when they were living there like 
Lüleburgazlı people did.  
After observing the negative stereotypes attained to Kurds by some of the local 
respondents and the threat perceived by the locals, it is interesting to see that Kurds 
perceive a positive attitude towards themselves and feel accepted. Personally, I question 
whether they really share their true perceptions and feelings with me. As I am also a 
local people of Lüleburgaz, they could have avoided from sharing their negative 
perceptions about the local residents with me. In their study, Shelton et al. (2003) point 
out that the expectation of prejudice may influence the intergroup interactions. In this 
case, it is possible that they try to have a positive influence on me to prevent me from 
                                               
37
  “Buranın milletinden %70'i suya sabuna dokunmayan bir millettir.” 
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having negative opinions about them. Their expressions like “I do not say this because 
you are here”38 (Ethem, 56 – Durak), “I do not say this because you are doing 
interview with me, I always express this: I am happy to live here” (Bahar, 38 – 8 
Kasım) show that they need to confirm that my existence as a local people does not 
influence their expressions. 
 
5.2. Intergroup Relationship and the Effects of Social Contact 
 
5.2.1 Intergroup Relationships 
 
First of all, it should be noted that neither local residents nor Kurdish residents 
feel realistic threat from one another. Accordingly, the factors that shape intergroup 
relationship between these groups are basically perceived threats, preserving social 
status and maintaining a positive social identity. 
 
5.2.1.1 Integrated Threat Perceptions 
 
To begin with, local people perceive threat from Kurds on three aspects of the life 
in the city: fear of unemployment, lifestyle and values. Most of the local respondents 
believe that the existence of Kurds in the city endangers employment opportunities. For 
instance, Orhan (50 – Durak) and Ali (27 – Durak) argue that the majority of the 
employers are from the East and that they favor the Kurdish applicants during 
employment processes. Furthermore, Kemal (30 – 8 Kasım) implies that economic 
concerns are more dangerous in terms of intergroup relationship between local people 
and Kurdish residents compared to identity issues by claiming that: 
 
                                               
38
  “Sen buradasın diye demiyorum bak…” 
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“At the moment, there is no tension in the society because there are jobs for everyone 
in this industrial society. However, the fight may start if these opportunities no longer 
exist. (...) As the unemployment increases, unemployed parties will blame each other. 
They will want to eliminate the other in order to survive. (...) Even though the conflict 
outbreaks as an identity conflict, the root cause will be economical”. 
 
This claim is important because there is no current unemployment risk in 
Lüleburgaz. Yet, local residents have already concerns about unemployment due to 
migration. What separates a realistic threat from perceived threat is believing in the 
existence of a threat as a result of personal assumptions rather than solid evidences or 
signs. In fact, perceived threats reflect the prejudices of the people instead of addressing 
to a conflict. 
As for the freedom, local respondents perceive threat on their lifestyles. They 
think that the Kurdish people are so religious and conservative that they judge the local 
people and make them feel uncomfortable. Gonca (57 – Durak), for instance, complains 
about the conservative dressing of the Kurdish residents in Durak neighborhood and 
states that this restricts their life. She is also worried about the religious groups, such as 
“Süleymancılar and Fetullahçılar39” that some Kurdish residents belong to, claiming 
that this causes discrimination in terms of beliefs. Similarly, Olcay (28 – 8 Kasım) 
states that the Kurdish residents’ lifestyle and opinions do not conform to the local 
residents by adding that “they have to conform to the local lifestyle as long as they live 
in this city”. Orhan (50) from Durak and Mert (28) from 8 Kasım are the other local 
residents who think that the Kurdish population rejects adapting to local culture and 
constitutes a threat to the local lifestyle. 
The most common and intense threat perception is related to values and culture, 
though. Local residents from both neighborhoods point out to the cultural differences 
between the Lüleburgazlı people and the Kurdish residents. They criticize Kurds for 
practices such as endogamy and express their opposition regarding the practice of this 
kind of traditions in Lüleburgaz. That’s why they do not approve intermarriage with 
Kurds. Also, as Olcay (28 – 8 Kasım) mentions, they think that it is more difficult to 
                                               
39
  Gülen movement and Süleymancı community are two religious movements/organizations which 
have their own followers. For years, they have been associated with sharia by the state and the 
mainstream media.  
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become friends with Kurds compared to other migrant groups. This shows that 
stereotypes have a great impact on intergroup relationships. 
Moreover, some of the local residents also express the threat they perceive on 
their national values. At this point, these residents shift to their national identity and 
their discourses change accordingly. They talk about “Kurdish-Turkish fight” (Orhan, 
50 – Durak) and the “importance of Turkish flag” (Sonay, 25 – 8 Kasım). In fact, Orhan 
(50 – Durak) believes that there is no conflict at the societal level and the problem is the 
lack of state attention towards the needs of Kurds. He even supports education in 
Kurdish language, stating that Turkish people should also need to learn Kurdish as it is 
a language of this country. However, he feels uncomfortable about the Kurdish people 
who “have a tendency to bring the PKK and the PKK flag in the forefront”. Sonay (25 
– 8 Kasım) also mentions an incident when some Kurdish people burnt the Turkish flag 
and states that she never accepts a harm to her values. She even says that she may 
prevent the people around her from becoming friends with the Kurdish people in case 
those Kurds are from the “bad ones”. The attitude of Sonay (25 – 8 Kasım) and 
concerns of Orhan (50 – Durak) show that integrated threat may give great harm to 
inter-group relationships by preventing people trust each other; it causes them to feel 
intergroup anxiety, hence prevents people from communicating without having 
concerns about whether the other person is a "bad Kurd" or a "good Kurd". 
Kurdish residents, on the other hand, do not express any current threat 
perceptions regardless of the neighborhood they live in. However, most experienced 
realistic threats in the past. For example, Bahar (38 – 8 Kasım) talks about some cases 
where the local people criticized her for speaking Kurdish, but she does not generalize 
them to all local people. Also, Ethem (56 – Durak), states that there were times when 
people made fun of the dress of his mother and opposed to their speaking Kurdish in 
public, but says that these were in the past. According to him, Lüleburgaz is a more 
metropolitan city now and people have learned to live together with the Kurdish 
population. However, it may the case that they may not share their true feelings with 
me due to the same reasons I mentioned above with regards to their outgroup 
perceptions.  
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5.2.1.2 Social Status 
 
Another factor that impacts intergroup relationships is social status. Residents 
who identify themselves as Lüleburgazlı believe that they have a superior position in 
the social hierarchy. Accordingly, they refer to a legitimizing discourse to ensure their 
position, which emphasizes the ‘majority’ and ‘native’ characteristics of the 
Lüleburgazlı people. The below statement by Olcay (28 – 8 Kasım) is a good example 
for such discourse: 
 
“There are not so many [migrants] here. They are mostly in Çerkezköy, Çorlu... 
Kırklareli, Lüleburgaz, Edirne, Hayrabolu, etc. are liberated areas for us. But Çorlu 
and Saray are in their hands. (...) A man comes here from Ağrı, builds a factory and 
brings people from the East instead of employing Thracian people. They favor people 
from their home region40. And my Thracian people have to migrate.” 
 
In this statement, the expression “liberated area” and the claim that “Thracian 
people have to migrate” create a mental representation in which the Thracian cities are 
invaded – hence, need to be liberated – and local people have to evacuate the cities. 
Similarly, Ali (27 – Durak) states that the Easterners buy stores from the Burgaz 
people and then exclude them. The word “exclusion” in this sentence does not only 
carry a blaming, but it also shows that the threat perceived with regards to employment 
opportunities is in line with the concern for social value distribution within the city. We 
see a similar approach in an anecdote told by Umut (62 – Durak) regarding the 
candidacy of a Kurdish resident in Durak for muhtarlık.  
 
“For the local elections they have nominated a candidate for muhtarlık. Even though 
they know that he will not be elected, they have nominated him. We want a member41 
from them in order not to exclude them, but that man gave up the following day. The 
Kurdish people in the neighborhood did not let him and told him that he could not be 
                                               
40
  “Memleketçilik oynuyorlar yani” 
41
  Muhtar azası. 
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the member of a Turkish muhtar. (...) That Kurdish candidate has a poster hanged 
[around the neighborhood]. On the other hand, we have four candidates and none of 
them have posters”. 
 
When we look at the discourse employed in the above example as well as the 
above statement of Ali, we see that Lüleburgazlı residents compare and contrast their 
position with the Kurds’ frequently. As the native and majority population of the city, 
they do not accept Kurdish residents’ owning shops in the city center or claiming an 
official post in the city. Umut (62 –Durak) acknowledges that by saying: “They have no 
personal harm to me, but we are disturbed by seeing them behaving so freely”. 
On the other hand, a Kurdish resident from the segregated area of Durak, Ethem 
(56), poses a totally new approach towards the share of opportunities and positions in 
the city. He states that he worked in the construction of the Istanbul streets and that they 
[Kurdish workers] have a great contribution to the city. A local resident Umut (62 – 
Durak) also accepts the efforts of Kurdish residents by saying the following: 
 
“But they are hard-working. I see that all the people on the 6 a.m. minibus service are 
Kurds who are going to work. They accept any job. They come as a construction 
worker, and then become a building contractor. So, instead of saying that the 
Easterners have come and got the jobs, we should criticize our laziness.” 
 
Likewise, Orhan (50 – Durak) supports that it is normal for Kurds to come and 
own land or house in their region, but still maintains his view that the cultural 
differences constitute a threat on the local lifestyle. In other words, they appreciate their 
works, but they hesitate to recognize this due to the threat perceptions and social status 
concerns that are summarized above. 
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5.2.2 Effects of Social Contact 
 
The conclusion we can draw from the interviews conducted by local and Kurdish 
residents in mixed and segregated neighborhoods is that social contact has no affect on 
the group level, nor does it have any generalizing influence on the local or Kurdish 
residents. 
It is a fact that segregated settlement of Kurds in Durak has a strengthening effect 
on the prejudices towards Kurds. For example, some of the local residents from Durak 
evaluate this segregated settlement as a sign of effort to create an area where Kurds are 
the majority and exercise control over the territories of that area as seen in the 
following examples: 
 
“They do not want to live separately in anywhere. They call one another. They may be 
afraid of failing to exercise control if they live as individual families. If they move into 
the city center they will get lost; not in terms of their customs, but in terms of child 
raising style. Also, they cannot stand out and say “I am Kurdish”, if they live as one or 
two families. They live collectively in order not to be oppressed. They do not want the 
name of their race become extinct” (Umut, 62 – Durak). 
 
However, contact does not eliminate these threat perceptions. Even if Umut has 
positive contact with his Kurdish neighbors who live next door, it does not change his 
mind about his aforementioned perceptions. The main reason for this inefficacy is that 
positive social contact is seen as an exception. Moreover, it leads to categorization of 
Kurdish people as the good ones and the bad ones. As an example, we can look at the 
following reflections of Umut who compares Kurds living in mixed neighborhoods 
with the ones living in the isolated area: 
 
“The good ones stay away from them [Kurds living in the isolated side]. In fact, they 
[the good ones] have not come here directly from the East, they have come to Burgaz 
from Ankara or Istanbul. So, they cannot live in that neighborhood where Easterners 
live, they move into the city center after a while. (...) They are willing to be accepted by 
us.” (Umut, 62) 
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Nevertheless, this comparison between the good Kurds and bad Kurds also serves 
to justify their prejudices about the Kurdish people living in the isolated area, instead of 
leading to a generalization of good stereotypes: 
 
“They could not get along together in the Kurdish side because people living there do 
not want to accept anything from around. Those who can accommodate themselves to 
the city cannot live there, so move into our side.” (Gonca, 57 – Durak) 
 
Another example is Gizem (44 – Durak). She talks about her two positive contact 
situations that she has experienced, one of which is with her Kurdish neighbors. The 
other one is an indirect contact through the experience of her daughter-in-law: 
 
“At first, we were worried; they have come from their hometown, several families are 
living in one house... Also, a different culture... However, as the time went by, we saw 
that they are good people, they are harmless.” 
 
“My daughter-in-law works in a supermarket. At first, her mother was afraid because 
Kurdish customers go to that supermarket, too. However, she is very happy with her job 
now. She says that Kurdish customers are very kind. Instead, she says that it is local 
people who behave her rudely. They always boss around her.” 
 
However, none of these experiences has changed her perception about the 
Kurdish migrants as a whole. She still thinks that Kurds are “hot-tempered” and 
“should learn to adapt to Lüleburgaz culture”. 
Another interesting finding with regards to social contact is that unlike the 
positive contact, outcomes of negative contact are generalized even though the contact 
takes place in an indirect setting such a movie or TV series. For instance, the 
stereotypes Sonay (25) attains to Kurds, such as endogamy, comes from the TV series 
about the life in the East. In addition, Olcay (28 – 8 Kasım) states the following: 
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“People see the fight between a soldier and a terrorist [in the TV series], for example, 
the terrorist attacks a village in a movie. And people make comments among each other 
by saying “look, that’s how they are”. 
 
On the other hand, the Kurdish respondents value social contact highly. 
Throughout the interviews, all of them emphasize that the local people “get used to 
them” and “get to know them”. In addition, Berkin (31 – Durak) states that people were 
more prejudiced towards Kurds in the past as such: 
 
“Previously, people were getting suspicious of me when I told them “I am from Kars. 
(...) Kurds were being labeled as terrorists. (...) However, in due course, we have gotten 
used to each other. They [Lüleburgazlı people] have become aware that the truth is not 
as they used to think" 
 
 Ethem (56 – Durak) also confirms Berkin’s statement by saying that the society 
in Lüleburgaz was like a “closed-book”42 in the 1990s. At this point, we can open a 
parenthesis for the effect of the environmental factors on the quality of the contact. In 
the armed conflict environment in the 1990s, it is obvious that the people were either 
avoiding contact or having negative experiences.  
It is obvious that contact outcomes observed in the expressions of local residents 
are not in line with the experiences of Kurdish residents. It is obvious that local 
respondents maintain the negative stereotypes that they attain to Kurds even in the case 
of positive social contact. They see the positive contact as an exception, but tend to 
generalize the outcome of negative contact. On the other hand, Kurds believe that 
throughout the years, local people have gotten used to them and their relationship has 
become more positive as they get to know each other. At this point, I should also note 
that I asked some of the Kurdish residents, including Ahmet (31 – 8 Kasım), Berkin (31 
– Durak) and Ethem (56 – Durak), “Do you think that there may be some local people 
who have negative perceptions about you? What do you think about them?” All of 
them answered this question by saying “Of course there may be such people, but they 
are in minority. The majority of the locals have accepted us.” 
                                               
42
  “Kapalı kutu gibiydi” 
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In order to understand why the outcomes change for these two groups, we may 
look at the contact situation as suggested by Allport (1954). First of all, it may be the 
case that local residents contact with Kurdish people at the interpersonal level, hence 
the outcomes do not have an influence on the intergroup perceptions. Also, Kurdish 
residents express more negative contact situations in 1990s. Therefore, they accept the 
relatively peaceful environment as a progress in intergroup relationships. In any case, a 
more comprehensive study is required in order to understand the factors which causes a 
difference between the perceptions of Kurdish and local residents regarding the contact 
outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 6:  DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
 
The aim of this study has been to explore the nature of intergroup relations and 
the effect of intergroup contact on the perceptions of group members within the context 
of local and Kurdish residents of Lüleburgaz city. The interview findings show that the 
intergroup relations in Lüleburgaz take shape around a social hierarchy determined by 
the local people. As the majority of the population, local people are the determiners of 
the boundaries between the categories within that social hierarchy. Accordingly, the 
outgroup perceptions of the local people are in line with the relevant positions of the 
social groups in the hierarchy. In other words, the outgroup which is placed as the 
lowest group in the social hierarchy is also perceived as more negatively than the other 
groups. As for the intergroup perceptions and the outcome of the contact between local 
and Kurdish residents, an asymmetry is observed. It is seen that Kurdish residents’ 
reflections about the locals are positive and they are more likely to generalize positive 
interactions with the local people. On the other hand, local residents’ reflections about 
the Kurdish residents are negative in general and they do not tend to generalize the 
positive interactions with Kurdish residents to their perceptions about Kurds. The 
following section will attempt to discuss these findings with a theoretical perspective. 
 
6.1 Social Hierarchy in Lüleburgaz 
 
Local respondents do not only position themselves as Lüleburgazlı people at a 
higher level, they also make distinction among different ethnic and social groups. Their 
expressions reveal six social categories. These are Lüleburgazlı people (self-definition 
of local people), migrants from nearby (Thracian) villages and cities, Bulgarian 
immigrants, migrants from the Black Sea region, Roma people and Kurds. 
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The category distinction in Lüleburgaz is made through two main identifiers: 
the level of urbanity and ethnicity. According to Hornsey (2008), these identifiers serve 
to maximize intergroup differences and to minimize intragroup differences. In this 
regard, it is seen that local respondents do not only content themselves with making 
distinction (‘maximizing the difference’) between the Turkish and non-Turkish (Roma 
people and Kurds) categories. They also limit their category (‘minimizing the 
intragroup differences’) with the characteristics such as individualization, secularism, 
high income, less traditional lifestyle.  
The urbanity characteristics do not only minimize the intragroup differences, 
they also serve to create a positive Lüleburgazlı identity. As it is stated by Tajfel and 
Turner (1979), group members tend to establish a positive social identity through 
relational and comparative processes. Accordingly, local respondents in this study refer 
to urban characteristics when they compare themselves with the other groups. In this 
way, they make a positive distinction between themselves and the migrant groups and 
Roma people. In other words, positive ingroup stereotyping serves to establish a 
positive Lüleburgazlı identity, which eventually leads to ingroup satisfaction. 
 
6.2 Asymmetrical Perceptions and Asymmetrical Contact Outcomes 
 
In general, all the Kurdish and local respondents included in this study have 
experienced contact with the members of the other group. However, the outcome of the 
intergroup contact is observed to be different for each group. 
To begin with, it is seen that positive social contact with a Kurdish person does 
not change the perceptions of the local respondents about the Kurdish outgroup as a 
whole. They think that the person contacted is an exception. In this context, they refer 
to differentiation between "good Kurds" and "bad Kurds". They evaluate the Kurdish 
person with whom they have a positive contact as a “good Kurd" but the idea that “bad 
Kurds exist as well" persists. On the other hand, they all tend to generalize the negative 
contact to the whole Kurdish population, even though it is an indirect contact such as a 
scene from a TV series. On the contrary, Kurdish respondents do not generalize the 
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negative contact they have with the local people. Instead, they think that it is the 
negative contact situation which forms an exception in terms of their relationship with 
the local people. Instead, Kurdish people tend to generalize the positive contact that 
they experience with the local residents. The reason of this asymmetry in perceptions 
and contact outcomes can be evaluated under three themes: historical background of 
intergroup relationships, differences related to the majority/minority status of the group, 
group members and the limited effect of the disconfirming group members and contact 
conditions. 
 
Historical background of intergroup relationships 
The first theme is the effect of intergroup conflict on intergroup outcomes (Çelik 
et. al, n.d., ). Protracted conflicts, like the Kurdish question in Turkey, may generate 
rigid stereotypes which may be hard to challenge. In such long standing conflicts, the 
perceptions of the people are systematically shaped by certain mechanisms such as the 
state discourse (Yeğen, 2007), education system (İnce, 2012) and the media images 
(Romano, 2002). The support of political system, educational system and the media 
with regards to the establishment of stereotypes results in firm prejudices and an acute 
feeling of intergroup anxiety and mistrust. Çelik (2013) evaluates this acute feeling of 
intergroup anxiety as a psychological barrier in front of the peace building processes.  
In the case of Lüleburgaz, it is clear that the long standing conflict and the official 
discourse regarding the Kurdish question have established so strong negative 
perceptions about Kurdish people that positive interpersonal contact can hardly 
challenge the locals’ perceptions about the overall group. Even the reactions to the 
segregated Kurdish settlement reflect the state discourse of “separatism" in relation 
with the Kurdish movement. Local residents feel uncomfortable due to the segregated 
area and questions why some of the Kurdish people prefer to live there. In general, they 
evaluate the residential segregation as an attempt to dominate over that area. This 
perception is closely in line with the anxiety experienced due to the Kurdish demand 
for autonomy at the country level. The absence of questioning or negative perceptions 
about the segregated settlement of Roma people in Altıyol region proves this claim. 
Local respondents are generally indifferent to the residential segregation of Roma 
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people. Some of them even assess the existence of such an area positively. According 
to the group threat theorists, the reactions of the local respondents to the segregated 
settlement of Roma people are more predictable because these theorists assume that 
“(...) proximity represents real threat” (as in Gilliam et. al, 2002:756). Therefore, the 
only explanation regarding why the local people oppose the segregated settlement of 
Kurds and appreciate the Kurds moving to the mixed neighborhoods is the influence of 
the state discourse which has imposed the fear of Kurdish autonomy for years. The 
demand of local people that the Kurdish residents should move into the mixed 
neighborhoods, leave their customs and adapt themselves to the local culture reminds 
the forced migrations of Kurds to the Western cities (Çelik, 2012) and shows the 
influence of the state practices on the local people’s perceptions. 
As for the media images, some of the local people express how the TV series 
effect their feelings and opinions about the Kurds and Kurdish movement. Local 
respondents’ knowledge about the Kurds and Kurdish culture is limited with the 
“terrorist” images and customs such as dowry and intermarriage that they observe in the 
TV series. As suggested by Mazziotta et al. (2011), they take these images as models of 
outgroup members and their culture. In this regard, it is seen that the media plays a 
stereotype reinforcing role in the perceptions of the local residents. 
Shortly, the influence of the long standing conflicts and the mechanisms shaping 
the perceptions of the group members sheds light onto the need for considering the 
current interaction results in a broader context. As suggested by Tropp, when we take 
“accrued histories of social experiences” (2003:144) of Turks with regards to the 
Kurdish question and evaluate their perceptions in relation with the state and media 
discourse they have been exposed for years, we see that long standing mistrust and 
strongly established stereotypes limit the ability of the local residents to challenge their 
perceptions about Kurds and to generalize their positive experiences. 
 
Differences related to the majority/minority status of the group 
Another theme to explain the perceptual asymmetry in the contact outcomes is the 
differences related to the majority/minority status of the group. According to Shelton, 
“majority and minority group members both have interpersonal concerns that may 
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differentially shape the dynamics of the interaction” (2003:179). For example, Çelik et. 
al (n.d.) state that one of the primary concerns of the minority groups is stigmatization, 
i.e. becoming the target of prejudice. Accordingly, they both develop “self-protection 
motives” (ibid., 4) and value any intergroup interaction with the hope of being accepted 
by the majority group. 
In the case of Lüleburgaz, these concern of acceptance is very obvious in the 
Kurdish respondents. Kurdish residents continuously state that “the locals have 
accepted them”. “Knowing half of the city”, “being greeted by the shop-owners when 
walking down the street”, “participation of the local neighbors in the wedding 
ceremonies of Kurds”, etc. are evaluated as signs of acceptance by the Kurdish 
respondents. Kurdish people do not want to devalue these positive interactions by 
shifting the focus to the negative experiences they have lived with the local people. 
This may be also considered as an attempt to “restore the broken relations" (ibid., p. 
22). From their expressions during the interviews, it is understood that the Kurdish 
respondents are pleased with the recent resolution attempts. For all of them, peace 
means a more comfortable life in Lüleburgaz and greater acceptance by the local 
people. Therefore, even the smallest positive interaction with the local people is a hope 
and relief for them. 
Çelik et. al also point out to the “interdependence of the city life” (ibid., p. 3) 
when evaluating the asymmetrical results of intergroup contact. Even they live in 
physically segregated areas such as Durak neighborhood, Kurdish residents depend 
mostly on local people for employment. In addition, the municipality officers from 
whom they demand service are mostly local people of Lüleburgaz. As a result, 
acceptance by the local people or at least building a positive image in the eyes of the 
local residents are important for Kurds in terms of employment and access to services. 
On the contrary, local residents as the majority group, are not concerned about the 
prejudice from the other groups. Accordingly, during their interactions with Kurdish 
people, they do not need to reflect on the status of their group or on how they are 
perceived as a group (Tropp and Pettigrew, 2005). Therefore, the interaction is most 
likely to remain at the interpersonal level as in the case of local residents of Lüleburgaz. 
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Limited effect of disconfirming group members and contact conditions 
As it is already stated, local people perceive the Kurdish residents with whom 
they experience a positive interaction as “good Kurds” and hence, as an exception to 
the Kurds in general. In fact, encounter with an outgroup member who does not fit into 
the established stereotypes may challenge and weaken these stereotypes. However, 
Wolsko et al. (2003) suggest that this outcome depends on specific conditions. 
According to them, generalization of positive contact outcome is possible only if the 
“disconfirmers are judged typical of the group and this will possible more likely to 
occur when the group stereotype is already weak” (ibid., p. 107). In the case of 
Lüleburgaz, the historical background of the intergroup relationship between Kurds and 
Turks has obviously established strong stereotypes that is difficult to weaken. 
Another suggestion to achieve positive contact outcomes is the four conditions 
offered by Allport (1954): equal group status, common goals, intergroup cooperation, 
and the support of authorities, law, or custom (in Pettigrew, 1998:66). Allport (ibid.) 
considers these conditions as facilitators to obtain positive contact outcomes, i.e. an 
overall change in the perceptions of the group members. In the interviews conducted 
for this study, Kurdish respondents put a significant emphasis on the common goals and 
support of law as the factors which they assume have changed the intergroup relations 
in Lüleburgaz. They mention how their work in Lüleburgaz as construction workers, 
etc. have contributed to the life in the city. For the Kurdish respondents, the welfare in 
Lüleburgaz is a common goal of both the locals and the migrants. They also express 
that the recent resolution attempts have contributed to the peace in Lüleburgaz. When 
they evaluate their relations with the locals, they always make distinction between their 
relations before the resolution attempts and their relations after the resolution attempts. 
However, we see that this change assumed by Kurds is not reflected in the 
expressions of the local respondents. On the contrary, they still express negative 
perceptions and do not tend to generalize their positive interactions with Kurdish 
people. At this point, it is understood that we should make a distinction between the 
perceptions and attitudes. In fact, the change expressed by the Kurdish respondents has 
occurred in the attitudes of the local people, not in the perceptions. In other words, the 
legal and political steps taken as part of the resolution process have provided a more 
secure environment for the Kurdish residents to speak their native language and to 
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express their ethnic identity by limiting any negative attitude from the local residents. 
Also, most of the local respondents express that Kurdish residents contribute to the 
economy of the city and that both groups have a common goal of having an 
economically and socially comfortable life. Yet, these legal regulations and awareness 
of the common goals are obviously not enough for a change in perceptions. Therefore, 
we can talk about an attitudinal change in the case of Lüleburgaz instead of a perceptual 
change. Ans this attitudinal change is not related to the intergroup contact, because the 
findings show that it is the result of legislative regulations and economic concerns. 
As Bilewicz (2007) points out, categories are constructed historically. Negative 
perceptions about another group are shaped over years with the help of three important 
systems: state, education and the media. Moreover, existence of a protracted violent 
conflict and majority/minority relations (i.e. status concerns) reinforce these negative 
thoughts and feelings. The findings of this study do not only support the relation 
between these factors and negative perceptions; they also show how these established 
perceptions may be difficult to challenge preventing the generalization of positive 
results of interpersonal interactions to an intergroup level. 
To sum up, the most important finding of this research is that positive social 
contact does not always result in change in outgroup perceptions, at least that is the 
case in Lüleburgaz. In relation with this finding, it is seen that even some optimal 
contact situations fail to create the required positive contact outcome. Although social 
contact is observed to have a positive effect on interpersonal relations, its influence on 
the perceptions of the people about the outgroup as whole is limited. That is because, 
even though social contact is effective on the affective ties between two people, it has 
difficulty to challenge the cognitive aspects of perceptions which are constructed 
through strict stereotyping and categorization processes. At this point, it is understood 
that in some cases, especially during officially conducted peace processes, a more 
structured intergroup contact may be required to obtain the desired results in an 
accelerated way (Zitomer, 2010). By ‘structured intergroup contact’, I mean a carefully 
designed contact environment, from the physical conditions to the timing and the 
content of the contact, in which group members will interact as ‘group members’ 
instead of individuals. This way, parties may found the opportunity to express their 
collective fears and opinions as well as to overcome their anxiety. Especially in 
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Lüleburgaz, dialogue studies, for example,  may also be helpful to help the local people 
overcome their threat perceptions. Last but not least, having seen the effect of vicarious 
contact on the perceptions of the people, it is of great importance to change the state 
discourse and the media representations of Kurds and Kurdish culture. 
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APPENDIX 1: MAP OF LÜLEBURGAZ 
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APPENDIX 2: SATELLITE IMAGE OF DURAK NEIGHBORHOOD 
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APPENDIX 3: SATELLITE IMAGE OF 8 KASIM NEIGHBORHOOD 
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APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE LOCAL RESIDENTS 
 
 
 
 
1) Öncelikle biraz kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? 
2) Kendinizi ne kadar Lüleburgazlı olarak hissediyorsunuz? 
- Sizce Lüleburgazlı kime denir? 
3) Lüleburgaz'da yaşamak nasıl sizce? İyi ya da kötü tarafları var mı? 
4) Bildiğiniz gibi insanlar çeşitli nedenlerle yaşamak için başka şehirlere göç ediyorlar. 
Lüleburgaz'da göç alan bir şehir. Bu konudaki düşünceleriniz neler? 
- Göçmenlerin şehir üzerinde bir etkisi var mı sizce? Nasıl bir etki bu? 
5) Peki mahallenizden memnun musunuz? Ne düşünüyorsunuz mahallenizle ilgili? 
- Bu mahallede kimler yaşar? 
6) Bu mahallede kendinizi nasıl hissediyorsunuz? Sorunlar oluyor mu? Neden? 
- Kürt göçmenlerden bahsetmişse: Bu yaşananlar sizin bu grupla/genel olarak Kürtlerle 
(özellikle belirtmişse) olan ilişkinizi, düşüncelerinizi nasıl etkiledi? 
7) Mahallede kimlerle arkadaşlık yaparsınız, kimlerle görüşürsünüz daha çok? 
- Neden? 
Yerlileri özellikle belirtiyorsa: 
114 
 
- Peki arkadaşalrınızdan veya ailenizden birinin yerli nüfus dışından insanlarla 
arkadaşlık yapmasına nasıl bakarsınız? 
- Yerli nüfus dışındaki tüm insanalr için mi aynı tepkiyi gösterirsiniz yoksa tercih 
ettiğiniz ya da etmediğiniz belirli gruplar var mı? 
Yerlileri vurgulamadıysa: 
- Göçmenlerle ilişkileriniz nasıl? Yerli nüfus dışında biriyle arkadaşlık yaptığınızda, 
tanıştığınızda o grupla ilgili fikriniz de değişiklik oldu mu? Daha önce fark etmediğiniz 
ya da bilmediğinizi anladığınız şeyler oldu mu? 
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APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR THE KURDISH RESIDENTS 
 
 
 
 
Interview Questions for the Kurdish Residents 
1) Öncelikle biraz kendinizi tanıtır mısınız? 
- Doğduğunuz, büyüdüğünüz yer neresi? 
- Etnik kimliğinizi ne olarak tanımlarsınız? 
- Ne kadar zamandır Lüleburgaz'da yaşıyorsunuz? 
- Lüleburgaz'a göç etme nedeniniz neydi? 
- Lüleburgaz'ı seçme nedeniniz neydi? 
- Kendinizi ne kadar buraya ait hissediyorsunuz? 
2) Peki Lüleburgaz hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz? Burada yaşamak nasıl sizce? 
- Zorluklardan bahsetmişse: Sizce bu zorluklar neden kaynaklanıyor? 
- Zorluklardan bahsetmemişse: Lüleburgaz'da yaşamanın zorlukları var mı? Sorusundan 
sonra yukarıdaki soru. 
4) Neden bu mahallede yaşamayı seçtiniz? Bu mahallenin özelliği ne sizce? 
- Bu mahallede kimler yaşar? 
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5) Bu mahallede kendizi nasıl hissediyosunuz? Yaşadığınız sıkıntılar oluyor mu? 
6) Arkadaş çevrenizden bahseder misiniz biraz? Kimlerle arkadaşlık yaparsınız? 
- Mahalleden bahsetmemişse: Bu mahalleden, özellikle yerli nüfustan arkadaşlarınız da 
var mı? Burada kendinizi yakın hissettiğiniz insanlar kimler? 
Varsa: 
- Mahalledeki arkadaşlığınızı nasıl değerlendirirsiniz? 
- Bu arkadaşlıklarınız bu mahallede/Lüleburgaz'da yaşamaya, Lüleburgazlılara ya da 
genel olarak Türklere olan bakışınızı etkiledi mi? 
Yoksa: 
- Neden? 
- Ailenizden/arkadaşlarınızdan biri mahallediklerle görüşüyorsa/görüşse ne 
düşünürsünüz? 
- (Eğer gerginlik nedeniyle görüşme yoksa) Mahallede yaşadığınız bu gerginlik/tatsızlık 
sizin mahallede dışında da Lüleburgazlılara karşı duygu ve düşüncelerinizi etkiliyor 
mu? 
 
 
 
 
